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I
A very great deal has been written about Ecclesiastes over the 
last two millennia.1 The inclination of earlier generations was to 
read it, and to qualify its claims, in the light of other biblical liter-
ature, with the result that it has not always had the reputation for 
subversiveness that it has tended to enjoy in modern scholarship. 
Its provocative tone, however, and its concern with the human 
condition have always attracted interest.2 It is also a very difficult 
1  For commentaries from the third to sixteenth centuries, see Starowie yski, 
‘Le Livre de l’Ecclésiaste dans l’antiquité chrétienne’, 424–40; for commentaries 
and other studies 1523–1875, Weeks, The Making of Many Books; for 1875–1988, 
Reinhard Lehmann’s bibliography in Michel, Untersuchungen, 291–322; for 
1988–1998, Béatrice Perrigaux Allison’s bibliography in Rose, Rien de nouveau, 
557–629. I am aware of more than 800 studies that have appeared since then. 
About a hundred of those published between 2000 and 2013 are surveyed in 
Lavoie, ‘Les Études’; cf. also Schwienhorst-Schönberger, ‘Neues unter der 
Sonne’, for 1987–1997, and ‘Neuere Veroffentlichungen’, for 1998–2003.
2  If Ecclesiastes was ever at risk of being excluded from the biblical canon, 
it is not clear that its more difficult assertions were the reason. The Talmud 
includes a lengthy discussion of Ecclesiastes and Proverbs (see b. Šabbat 30b), 
in the course of which it is suggested that earlier sages had wished to suppress 
both books because they were self-contradictory (Dell, ‘Ecclesiastes as Wisdom’, 
313–17, helpfully presents translations of this and other relevant passages). The 
Mishnah (Yadayim 3.5) also seems to suggest that the status of Ecclesiastes was 
disputed by the early rabbis, although it gives no explicit reason, and the book 
is linked here instead with Song of Songs (cf. b. Megillah 7a, which also talks 
about Esther). There is a reference in this discussion to a declaration in favour of 
both books, and Graetz, in an appendix to his commentary (147–73) hypothesized 
that there had been a ‘Council of Jamnia’ (or ‘Yavneh’) at which the contents 
of the Jewish canon had been finalized, and the canonical status of Ecclesiastes 
established. Aune, ‘Origins’, suggests that Graetz was influenced by a similar 
suggestion in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (which can be found at 
the end of ch. 10). That view is no longer generally held (cf. Dempster, ‘Canon’, 
391–92): it is unlikely that any formal decision about the book’s status was ever 
made within Judaism, and the nature of any controversy surrounding it is unclear. 
The mishnaic discussion speaks mysteriously in terms of books that are accepted 
to be sacred ‘defiling the hands’, and some apparently supposed that Ecclesiastes 
did not do so—but this very concept may have been poorly understood by the 
rabbis themselves, and it is interpreted in various ways by modern scholars; see, 
e.g., Barton, The Spirit and the Letter, 108–21; Broyde, ‘Defilement’; Goodman, 
‘Sacred Scripture’; Lim, ‘Defilement’; Beckwith, Canon, 278–81. Strikingly, 
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book, not only in the sense that its claims have so often seemed to 
need such qualification, but also in the more basic sense that it is 
hard to read: generations of commentators have struggled to under-
stand what the text actually says or means at many points. Luther 
was probably right to suspect that some engage with it principally 
for the pleasure of wrestling with its puzzles,3 but this has also, of 
course, been the source of much confusion and frustration, and it 
has compounded the broader problems of interpretation. Although 
a great deal has been written, therefore, it would be hard to claim 
that a great deal has been agreed amongst scholars, or that any 
consensus is ever likely to emerge around some issues.
In his important recent commentary, and in a series of other works 
spanning several decades, Anton Schoors has put every subsequent 
commentator in his debt by gathering many of the different opinions 
on particular points, and at that level it does remain possible to 
discuss and adjudicate between them—as I have tried to do in my 
own commentary, below.4 It is a lot more difficult, however, to 
when R. Simeon claims in the Tosefta (Yadayim 2.14) that Ecclesiastes does 
not defile the hands, it is simply because he believes it to have been written by 
Solomon himself, rather than through divine inspiration. We do, to be sure, find 
early Jewish suspicions about the book’s ideas described in Jerome’s commentary 
to 12.13–14 and in Leviticus Rabbah (28.1): Halperin, ‘Book of Remedies’, 
explores the various stories and traditions that arose around the ‘Solomonic’ books 
more generally. However, although rabbis and interpreters of various generations 
seem to have understood the book to have been the subject of controversy at some 
point in the past, they do not seem to have shared any single or consistent view of 
the reasons for that controversy, and they certainly did not avoid using Ecclesiastes 
themselves: Bickerman, Four Strange Books, 153, claims that, ‘Of its 222 verses, 
122 are quoted in rabbinic sources’.
3  In the preface of his commentary; the 1573 English translation speaks 
of ‘eche man labouryng to frame diverse of the sayinges therein to his owne 
profession, or rather opinion whether for that their curiositie was delighted in 
strange, obscure and unwonted matters: or else for that in such obscure and 
darke writyngs, it is easie for a man to fayne what hee phansieth and supposeth’. 
Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 146–47, compares the book to a Rubik’s Cube, presenting 
stimulating problems that are ‘there to be solved by engaging the reader’s mind’ 
(146). Given the notorious problems presented by its language alone, I am not sure 
on what basis Davis (166) claims that ‘Koheleth’s language is invariably simple’.
4  There is a significant overlap, of course, between Schoors’ 2013 commentary 
and his earlier works—in particular The Preacher I and II. The commentary 
became available only after I had finished a significant proportion of my own 
work, and I have retained existing references to these other studies, but noted 
places where the views expressed in his commentary differ.
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give any similar overview of ideas about the book’s themes and 
message, or about aspects of its structure and presentation. In part, 
this is simply because there are so many: even in 1861, Christian 
Ginsburg’s ‘Historical Sketch of the Exegesis of the Book’ ran from 
page 27 to page 243 of his commentary while barely scratching the 
surface of many issues, and much has been written since then. The 
greater problem, though, is that scholars find many different sorts 
of interconnection, so that it is not simply a matter of some scholars 
believing the book to say one thing while another group believes it 
to say something different. Writing of scholarship on Ecclesiastes in 
the late sixteenth century, which was a lot less diverse in its views 
than is current scholarship, Ginsburg remarked that ‘Every fresh 
commentator either actually or virtually regards all his predecessors 
as having misunderstood Coheleth’ (73)—and Eric Christianson, 
in Ecclesiastes Through the Centuries, sets that alongside many 
similar observations by others, among the testimonia that preface 
his own excellent history of the book’s reception.
Rather than try to aggregate all these views, I have opted in the 
introduction to set out my own, and to use these, so far as practical, 
as a framework for the discussion of other opinions in key areas. It 
may be taken as a given that, since scholars disagree with each other 
on so many points, little that I say would win the assent of every 
other commentator, although I have tried to indicate where my 
opinions represent the view of a minority, or are cries in the wilder-
ness. I should stress also, however, that even where there is some 
consensus with respect to the interpretation of specific passages, 
the fact of consensus does not always put that interpretation beyond 
question: some understandings survive, I think, more through their 
appeal to past authority than through any inherent credibility (4.5 
offers a parade example). Certain of the broader claims often made 
about the book seem similarly rooted in habit or inertia, and I have 
attempted to question these thoroughly, even where I agree with 
them myself.
After some experimentation, it has proved easiest to deal with 
the important issues in two main discussions, respectively covering 
the internal matters of presentation and content, and the external 
matters of date and context—although there is necessarily some 
overlap between them. The third main part of the introduction is 
quite different in character, and addresses the textual history of the 
book. I have prefaced it with an overview for those readers who 
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would prefer not to grapple with the drier technical issues, but I 
have also gone considerably further than other commentators in 
setting out the background to the key versions of Ecclesiastes. 
There are several reasons for this, the most important being that 
our understanding of certain issues has been transformed in the last 
few decades. The character and context of the Septuagint transla-
tion of the book, in particular, is much better understood, and this 
has consequences for the weight that we should give to its testi-
mony. Although, furthermore, it is now more than a quarter of a 
century since the initial publication of the fragments from Eccle-
siastes found among the Dead Sea Scrolls at Qumran, these have 
been undeservedly neglected by most recent commentators. At a 
more fundamental level, though, disagreements continue to simmer 
in text-critical circles around important aspects of the Hebrew text, 
such as the real antiquity of the vocalization applied to it in medi-
eval times, the date at which, and extent to which the consonantal 
text became fixed, and the proper approach to variants recorded 
only in late manuscripts. In most respects, I think, my opinions here 
are not out of step with the majority of other scholars who have 
worked with the texts and versions, but they may well be unfamiliar 
to those who do not work in this area, and it seems important, in 
any case, to state them: there are several places in the commentary 
where I have adopted readings that have been ignored or rejected by 
previous commentators, and this section of the introduction offers a 
background, a context, and, I hope, part of the justification for those 
decisions.
A. The Presentation and Content of the Book
It is as difficult to pull apart the various elements of the discourse 
in Ecclesiastes as it is to separate the significance of its words 
from the way they are presented. Rather than try to do either, I 
have opted, therefore, to present here a single brief account of the 
book, covering both aspects together—although we shall have to 
return to some questions again later, when we look at the style and 
affinities. As I have suggested already, a proper discussion of the 
many and varied past interpretations would fill several volumes in 
itself, so this account is necessarily of my own views, though I have 
tried to indicate the main areas of disagreement between scholars. 
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Since a detailed study of all the key passages will be offered in the 
commentary, furthermore, I have not attempted to offer at this point 
similarly detailed arguments in support of particular interpretations.
1. Attribution and Authorship
The bulk of the material that makes up Ecclesiastes is introduced 
to us as ‘the words of Qohelet’ in 1.1: ‘Qohelet’ is a mysterious 
epithet, not clearly either a name or a title, and its meaning is 
uncertain.5 That verse also informs us, however, that Qohelet was 
‘son of David, king in Jerusalem’, and 1.12 then goes on to say that 
he was ‘king over Israel in Jerusalem’. Since there were, strictly 
speaking, no other descendants of David who ruled ‘Israel’ (as 
opposed to Judah) from Jerusalem, readers have long taken this to 
mean that Qohelet must have been King Solomon. That, of course, 
suits well the association of Solomon with the collection or compo-
sition of aphorisms attested in 1 Kgs 4.32 and in the titles of the 
book of Proverbs, but if we are supposed to be hearing the voice 
of Solomon, then it is not clear why we are being told about ‘the 
words of Qohelet’. If Solomon or Qohelet is also the author of the 
book, furthermore, then whose is the voice that talks about them in 
1.1 and the epilogue of 12.9–14?
We shall look at the attributions to Solomon and Qohelet in more 
detail later, but the assumption I shall make in this commentary, 
mostly in line with other recent commentators, is that the book is a 
‘work of imagination’ (Segal, 1), and that the identity of its actual 
author is unknown to us. This author, however, was responsible for 
creating both the speech that is attributed to Qohelet—a fictional 
or fictionalized character—and an epilogue which comments on 
that speech.6 Modern scholars have tended to regard the link with 
5  Because the book itself is named after this protagonist, there is some scope 
for confusion. Throughout the commentary, I have followed the convention 
of referring to the book as ‘Ecclesiastes’ and the character as ‘Qohelet’. The 
latter, incidentally, reflects the usual Jewish pronunciation: ‘Qoheleth’—with an 
aspirated ‘t’—is, in principle, a more accurate transliteration of the word from 
biblical Hebrew, and is used by many other writers. On the meaning of ‘Qohelet’, 
see the notes on 1.1, below.
6  See especially Fox, ‘Frame-Narrative’. I have discussed the issue at much 
greater length in Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 13–19.
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Solomon as a facet of this presentation: the character Qohelet is 
portrayed as taking on, at least for a short part of the book, the 
identity of Solomon. I doubt myself that that is the case, for reasons 
which will become clear, but suspect instead that, if the informa-
tion in 1.1 and 1.12 is not just a curiously half-hearted, secondary 
attempt to identify Qohelet as Solomon, then it is intended to place 
the words of Qohelet on a par with the ‘Solomonic’ sayings in 
Proverbs.
Of course, many scholars until quite recently have worked on the 
rather different assumptions either that some historical ‘Qohelet’ 
himself wrote the book,7 and that the superscription and epilogue 
are simply additions to his original words,8 or that an editor has 
7  This permitted much speculation about his background, based either on 
assumptions about the social context of such authors or on the details offered 
by Qohelet within the book. Among the latter, Plumptre’s essay ‘The Author 
of Ecclesiastes’ (cf. pp. 36–55 of his commentary) is particularly memorable, 
tracing as it does at length Qohelet’s childhood and youth, his period of reckless 
sensuality, his friendship with a fellow Jew, and his passion for a woman who 
turned out to be false, before he was able to settle down with a family and confront 
old age. A number of recent studies have reacted strongly (and quite rightly, I 
think) against such readings, sometimes drawing out more general problems 
that surround the whole notion of autobiography or the literary first person. See, 
e.g., Salyer, Vain Rhetoric; Mills, Reading Ecclesiastes; more briefly, Koosed, 
(Per)mutations, 27–33.
8  A minority position, most famously voiced by Graetz (47–49) but expounded 
more recently (and a little differently) by Wilson, ‘Words of the Wise’, holds that 
the epilogue was not just added to an original version of Ecclesiastes, but to the 
emergent canon of the Writings, or some part of it (Proverbs and Ecclesiastes 
in Wilson’s view). De Pury, ‘Qohéleth’, 191–95, takes it, indeed, to identify 
Qohelet as the editor responsible for that collection. As noted by Graetz, the 
earliest exponent of this theory appears to have been Krochma l, in the eleventh 
chapter of his Guide (see especially p. 119, misprinted as ‘191’ in the first edition). 
Cheyne, in Job and Solomon, 232–34, gives a useful account of its nineteenth-
century reception (although he misunderstands Graetz’s reference, and cites 
Krochmal’s book as a journal), but goes on to show just how speculative it is. 
Sun, ‘Ecclesiastes’, treats the question in a different context, suggesting that the 
theme of death in the book as a whole has led to its inclusion among the Megilloth, 
more particularly, as a counterweight to themes in the other books, ‘but the 
epilogist may disagree with some of Qoheleth’s views and side with the rest of 
the Megilloth’ (190). I doubt myself that such deliberations were involved in the 
creation of that corpus, and although the specific claim about the epilogue may 
have weight in a final-form reading of the books together, it hardly speaks to the 
original intention behind its composition.
 INTRODUCTION 7
presented to us in this book words that were originally spoken by 
that historical Qohelet, and memorized or recorded in another form 
previously. It is difficult to disprove such assumptions, but they 
should not be our default position. Before Roman times, authorial 
attribution in the modern sense was not a general feature of ancient 
Near Eastern literature: most texts are anonymous, and those that 
give names at all (which tend to be confined to particular genres) do 
so not through a desire to identify the author, so much as to provide 
a ‘voice’, context or authority for their content. The simplest way 
to put it is that they bear the name of their principal character (who 
might or might not actually have existed as a person), and not that of 
their author—rather as Daniel Defoe originally presented Robinson 
Crusoe as a memoir by Crusoe himself.9
Many texts, Jewish and otherwise, certainly adopt this conven-
tion, and in those where it is possible that the named individuals may 
actually have been involved in the composition, that is probably not 
the reason why they have been named. None of this, it should be 
emphasized, is because the real authors were attempting to mislead 
their readers. Ancient attitudes to ‘pseudonymity’ are compli-
cated, and the term itself is somewhat misleading, but although the 
boundaries between author and character were sometimes blurred,10 
9  Provan puts a common assumption into words by insisting (29–30) that 
‘There is no good reason to doubt that [Qohelet] existed and worked just as the 
author who quotes his words asserts to us (12:9–10); it would be curious to receive 
the speaker’s words from this author and yet reject his rather clear testimony 
about their originator’. Such third-person presentations of fictional or fictionalized 
protagonists are not themselves uncommon in ancient literature, however, with 
Ahiqar (see below) offering a lengthy example, and one might as well say that 
the long third-person subtitle of Defoe’s novel, which summarizes the story, is 
itself evidence for the historicity of Crusoe. When such views are expressed by 
explicitly religious commentators, it is tempting to suggest that they arise from a 
certain discomfort with the idea that a text could be both fictional and canonical. 
It would be fair to note also, however, that scholars have often been slow to 
recognize fiction elsewhere among ancient texts: the basic historicity of Ahiqar as 
a person has often been defended, for instance, however historically improbable 
the portrayals of his life might seem, and the fictional Egyptian Tale of Sinuhe 
(which we shall also encounter later) was commonly read as a true story by earlier 
commentators. It might be better to say that orientalizing scholarship has tended to 
struggle with the idea that such relatively sophisticated, ‘realistic’ fiction, arguably 
pioneered in the modern West by Defoe, was pre-empted by other cultures.
10  See Weeks, ‘Predictive and Prophetic’, 35. The terminology itself creates 
problems. Baldwin, ‘Is There Pseudonymity?’, 8, denies its applicability here, 
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it is likely that ancient audiences were in general as aware of the 
conventions that governed attribution as modern readers are of 
those that govern, say, a first-person novel, with its own adoption of 
another voice by the author—and they are unlikely to have shared 
Koosed’s reaction, in her (Per)mutations, that ‘Qohelet, whoever 
he is, is lying to me’ (24). In the case of Ecclesiastes, matters are 
further complicated, however, because the attribution to ‘Qohelet’ 
is not straightforwardly an attribution to a named individual, and 
Koosed rightly goes on to say that ‘the author is using a persona 
who is writing under a pseudonym whose meaning we do not under-
stand’, which ‘obfuscates rather than illuminates identity’. That 
obfuscation may have been present from the outset, but if the author 
was playing with the conventions in some way that his audience 
did understand, it may no longer be possible for us to share that 
understanding.
Michael Fox, who has done more than anyone else to shift percep-
tions away from a simple identification of Qohelet as the author, 
speaks also of the material not attributed to Qohelet in the book 
(principally the epilogue) as a ‘frame’ for the speech, and corre-
spondingly of a ‘frame narrator’, who is in some sense no less a 
‘character’ than is Qohelet.11 What we hear in the book, therefore, is 
saying that ‘Qoheleth is no more pretending to be Solomon than Shakespeare is 
pretending to be Hamlet, but he is inviting his readers to see life through the eyes 
of that superbly endowed king’—which I would take to be the very essence of 
pseudonymity in ancient literature. Given the scope for confusion, however, it is 
perhaps best avoided, and Meek, ‘I was King’, 75–77, points out that we are not, 
of course, actually offered the name Solomon, strictly making the term inaccurate 
as well (except, perhaps, when applied to ‘Qohelet’).
11  Fox, ‘Frame-Narrative’, 91–92. So dominant in the twentieth century was 
the assumption that the epilogue is secondary, that it is easy to forget that by taking 
it as integral, Fox is reinstating a view that had been maintained previously by 
commentators as notable as Herzfeld, Hitzig (who speaks of the real author talking 
about his fictitious creation in 12.9–11) and Delitzsch (who is scathing about 
those scholars who confuse the book’s protagonist with its author). Where Fox 
is more innovative, is in his insistence that not even the epilogue simply presents 
the voice of the author. In general, his view is supported by a certain consistency 
between monologue and epilogue. Fox does not argue the point himself, and it is 
difficult to make strong claims on the basis of just a few verses, but the language 
of the monologue is distinctive and probably idiomatic (as we shall see later), and 
there is no reason to suppose that the epilogue is different in this respect—note, 
for instance, the use of š- in 12.9 (see Delitzsch, 215, who examines the matter in 
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never strictly the voice of the author, as such, but separate voices or 
identities adopted by the author. This is important for understanding 
the role and nature of the epilogue, which reacts to Qohelet and his 
words, but it also underscores the point that Qohelet himself need 
not be treated merely as a cypher for the author. In a work like Job, 
with multiple characters offering different opinions, it is easy to be 
aware that the author may share the views of no single character, but 
we should also be conscious that the use of Qohelet’s voice permits 
the author of Ecclesiastes to express provocative opinions that 
may likewise not have been his own. Correspondingly, he might 
not have expected his audience to accept all of those opinions, or 
to acquiesce in Qohelet’s idiosyncratic take on the world, while 
some of the ways in which his protagonist is presented may have 
been designed to shape perceptions of Qohelet alongside his actual 
words. As with much ancient literature, it can be helpful to treat 
what we are reading not as an essay in which an author speaks to 
us directly, but as something closer to a dramatic performance, in 
which we are supposed to react to the claims and viewpoints of a 
character who speaks before us.
2. The Character of the Monologue
The author probably does intend us, though, to understand the 
totality of Qohelet’s words as a single speech: they are structured 
with matching declarations in 1.2 and 12.8 which seem designed to 
bring them back to where they started, and the constant, thematic 
statements about the ‘vanity’ of particular phenomena themselves 
tie the intervening materials to those declarations. It is not unrea-
sonable, therefore, to speak of 1.2–12.8 as a ‘monologue’, and 
there are no explicit counter-indications that different parts were 
supposed to have been uttered at different times—although, as will 
detail). This suggests, of course, that the author has made no attempt to distinguish 
between the two voices, at least in terms of the sort of Hebrew that they use, but 
it is also, of course, an argument against the epilogue as a whole being the work 
of some later redactor, who would have had no obvious reason to avoid using 
more conventional literary Hebrew. Similarly, we may note the uses of ʾlhym in 
12.13–14, which accord with Qohelet’s usage in the monologue; Sheppard, ‘The 
Epilogue’, 184, notes that Proverbs, in contrast, always uses the divine name when 
it talks about fearing God.
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become clear, this monologue recounts Qohelet’s observations and 
experience over a period of time, and might loosely be described as 
a sort of fictive intellectual memoir. At many points, however, the 
book feels much more like an anthology or collection, held together 
by aspects of its language and expression, but thematically and 
stylistically diverse.
This diversity is apparent even in the first three chapters, which 
are generally regarded as the most coherent, because although it is 
possible to see a progression of ideas through Qohelet’s prologue 
about natural phenomena (1.4–11), his first-person account of his 
efforts to find something meaningful for humans in life (1.12–2.11), 
his reflections on those efforts (2.12–26), and his subsequent state-
ments about God and the world (3.1–15), the way he talks about 
them fits no simple pattern. After that point, the work will be punctu-
ated by other set-piece compositions—notably the further memoir 
in 7.23–8.1 and the description of a death in 12.3–5, which follows 
almost seamlessly from the commendations of living life properly 
in 11.7–12.2. There will also be some lengthy, if looser, discussions 
which draw together various materials and ideas around a theme—
wealth and the enjoyment of property in 5.7–6.9, for instance, or the 
issues around human ignorance and misperception that dominate 
8.5b through to 9.3 (or even, arguably, 9.12). Large parts of the 
book are filled, however, either by much shorter, even looser series 
of sayings and admonitions, or by the very brief, seemingly miscel-
laneous materials that make up much of chs. 7 and 10. There is, as 
we shall see, a certain rhyme and reason behind it, but this irregu-
larity has frustrated attempts to find a ‘structure’ for the monologue 
that is anything more than a rather vague description of it,12 and has 
12  As may be clear from my own presentation here, I think we can go no further 
than loosely to group consecutive passages as ‘sections’ when they share common 
themes or formal features—which is the approach of, e.g., Schoors, ‘La Structure 
littéraire de Qohéleth’ (an article that includes a helpful survey of previous 
attempts). Other commentators have sometimes tried to find much broader sections 
(there is another helpful review of some key proposals in Lohfink, ‘Strukturen’, 
39–52, and an excellent overview of the scholarship in d’Alario, Qohelet, 17–58). 
Seow (46–47), for instance, breaks the book into two major sections, with the 
division after 6.9, and each of these into two further sections, with sub-divisions 
after 4.16 and 8.17. In doing so, he is adapting the proposals of Backhaus, Den 
Zeit, who places the first sub-division instead after 3.22. When, however, these 
sub-divisions bear labels like ‘everything is elusive’ (6.10–8.17), or the first and 
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fueled other attempts to revise and re-order the book, on an assump-
tion that such apparent chaos could result only from disintegration or 
thoughtless redaction of the text.13 More generally, it has encouraged 
third are supposed to be ‘reflection’ while the second and fourth are ‘ethics’, it 
becomes reasonable to ask whether there is any genuine relationship between 
the descriptions and much of the content. If, say, 7.8–10 seem neither reflective 
nor concerned with elusiveness, placing them in such a section seems at best 
misleading; at worst, it can force a reading of them that is entirely inappropriate. 
Equally, if the structural markers are supposed to be clear, then it is a problem that 
searches for the same sort of markers turn up different results: Nicacci, ‘Qohelet’, 
also identifies two major sections, which he sees as parallel to each other, but 
for him, the break is after 7.14, a long way from Seow’s 6.9, and for Castellino, 
‘Qohelet’, the break falls at 4.17. Although scholars often look for them, there 
is no particular reason, in fact, to suppose that ancient writers (any more than 
modern ones) habitually built their compositions around balanced structures. The 
very different attempt of Wright, ‘Riddle of the Sphinx’, to identify structure 
through the book’s repetition of phrases and motifs may point to a way in which 
the writer has attempted to impose some order in the later, more miscellaneous 
parts of the book, although his own results are optimistic in their precision (as 
are those of Mulder, ‘Division’, which offers a revision of Wright’s hypothesis). 
That article should be distinguished, however, from his later ‘Riddle of the Sphinx 
Revisited’, and ‘Additional Numerical Patterns’, which offer a far less plausible 
account based on word and verse counts (later imitated in Stephanus, ‘Qohelet’, 
which consequently identifies 4.1–16 and 8.17–9.15, a little unexpectedly, as the 
book’s central texts). This technique—which seems to reflect what Asurmendi, Du 
non-sens, 16, calls ‘le penchant ludique de l’exégèse pour le Meccano’, loosely, 
the way exegetes love to play with texts as though with Meccano—is applied on 
a smaller scale in Wright’s ‘For Everything There Is a Season’. For a different but 
not wholly dissimilar attempt to demonstrate structural coherence, at least in the 
first two chapters, see especially Bons, ‘Zur Gliederung’.
13  Paul Haupt, not an admirer of the many interpolators he believed to 
have ruined the book, suggested that, ‘If the book in its present shape should 
have been written by one author, he must have been a duplex personality of 
the -  type. But the book we have is not intact. It reminds me of the 
remains of a daring explorer who has met with some terrible accident, leaving 
his shattered form exposed to the encroachments of all sorts of foul vermin.’ See 
‘The Book of Ecclesiastes’, 254. Bickell’s slightly earlier commentary is arranged 
on the premise (3–4) that, although there had been some hostile interpolation, 
the main problem with the order was that the original pages of Ecclesiastes had 
become disordered—which is improbable, since the book is unlikely to have been 
transmitted in a codex (with pages, as opposed to a scroll) earlier than the time at 
which it was translated into Greek, and the Septuagint Greek version has the same 
order as the standard Hebrew text. Cheyne, Job and Solomon, 204, advances the 
not dissimilar idea that ‘from chap. iii onwards we have before us the imperfectly 
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rather atomistic readings of Ecclesiastes, as a loose assemblage of 
different sayings or poems (so, e.g., Galling), perhaps even (as we 
shall see) reflecting different viewpoints.
The dissatisfaction that many readers have found in this aspect 
of the book, however, may be as much as anything a product of 
modern tastes and assumptions—as Good (Irony, 171) puts it, 
‘Perhaps we are too certain we know what a “book” is’.14 While it 
is true that Ecclesiastes closely resembles no other ancient compo-
sition in every respect, it is not difficult to find parallels to these 
particular characteristics—whether in the sudden shifts of style and 
topic that mark much of the Hebrew prophetic literature, or in the 
often baffling arrangement of aphorisms and admonitions in ancient 
instructions and sayings-collections.15 Among the latter, the famous 
Sayings of Ahiqar frames a very mixed group of sayings within a 
story of betrayal and high politics (presented, like Qohelet’s speech, 
as a first-person memoir in the oldest version that we have), and, 
rather differently, the Jewish book of Tobit moves disconcertingly 
from first-person memoir to third-person narrative,16 incorporating 
a number of set-piece prayers and sequences of admonitions, which 
to our eye appear simply intrusive. Rather than try to explain all 
such examples in terms of diverse sources or problems in transmis-
sion, it seems easier to accept that ancient audiences tolerated, and 
probably even enjoyed, such variations and shifts of tone. Without 
excluding the possibility that some may indeed have arisen in the 
course of transmission, we should certainly not assume that their 
worked-up meditations of an otherwise unknown writer, found after his death in 
proximity to a highly finished fragment which apparently professed to be the work 
of king Solomon’.
14  Similarly Canaday, ‘Qoheleth’, 33, ‘In many respects the book defies the 
Western mind that looks for clear breaks in thought around which it may be 
outlined’. See also, e.g., Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 147–48.
15  Lange, ‘Pre-Maccabean Literature’, 300–4, goes so far as to suggest that the 
‘seemingly random combination of different sapiental subgenres’ (303) is actually 
a mark of the instruction genre, to which Ecclesiastes must accordingly belong, 
even if it lacks other key features.
16  Events are seen wholly from Tobit’s viewpoint up to the point when he prays 
in ch. 3, and the narrative switches to third-person as soon as it extends its scope 
to events in distant Media of which he was unaware. This illustrates very well the 
extent to which person and perspective can be connected in ancient literature—
but it is as jarring to us as the sudden break from Janet Leigh’s point of view in 
Hitchcock’s Psycho, when the character she plays is killed.
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presence in Ecclesiastes marks the book as composite or its text as 
corrupt.
Again, indeed, it may be more helpful to think of the material 
as dramatic or performative. Qohelet is not a comedian,17 but his 
monologue resembles many modern stand-up routines, moving 
as they do through different topics with a mixture of anecdotes, 
one-liners, and maybe even poems.18 This is a performance rather 
like those, designed so that each part of it can be relished in its own 
right, and is not a logical disquisition—a fact that is never clearer 
than at those points where, as we shall see later, economy or clarity 
of sense seem to have been sacrificed in favour of sound and style. 
As Alter (Wisdom Books, 342) puts it, moreover, ‘the relative loose-
ness of form admirably suits the mobility of Qohelet’s thought’. 
We know very little about the way in which ancient compositions 
were ‘used’ by their readership, but there are grounds to suppose 
that many would actually have been performed before an audience 
(see, e.g., Miller, ‘Orality and Performance’), and it is certainly not 
difficult to imagine that this was the case with Ecclesiastes—Chris-
tianson (Time to Tell, 257) visualizes the monologue as a ‘one-man 
play’ (cf. Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 186–87).
17  The ‘humorous’ reading of the book in De s Rochettes, ‘L’Humour noir’, 
consists principally of imagining different expressions on Qohelet’s face, rather 
than identifying places where the text actually appears to be funny, but many 
readers have found a certain wryness, and Fisch, ‘Qohelet’, 173, speaks of ‘the 
playfulness, the sense of being amused at one’s own expense that are the mark of 
the ironic consciousness’. Jarick, in ‘Ecclesiastes among the Comedians’, seeks 
more precisely to find points of contact between the book and Athenian comedy, 
and finds many. Whatever we make of those individually, they show, at least, that 
the Athenian writers were capable of presenting extremely cynical and pessimistic 
claims in a context where the audience was expecting to laugh, and that we cannot 
easily judge the tone of a piece simply by the sentiments that we find in it. I am 
inclined myself (like Greenstein, ‘Sages’, and Levine, ‘Qohelet’s Fool’, ‘Humor’) 
to think that there probably is humour in the book, and at least a humorous use 
at times of the grotesque and unexpected, but suspect that Qohelet’s own part is 
often as the straight man, who might make us laugh, but does not laugh with us.
18  Shortly after I had first written this, I received a proposal for a paper by Knut 
Heim (‘Hyper-Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes’), subsequently delivered at the 2018 
SBL conference, in which he claims a little differently, although along the same 
lines, that, ‘It is as if Qoheleth speaks in the mode of modern stand-up comedians, 
where social critique is expressed regularly through indirection, innuendo, and 
humor, where the real meaning of what is being said only emerges from the 
speaker’s intonation (pitch, pause, speed, tone, stress, emphasis, etc.)’.
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3. Qohelet’s Ideas
It is hard simply to summarize Qohelet’s ideas without doing 
some injustice to them: they are strongly interconnected, and the 
monologue develops various of them in different directions. It is 
best to sketch this development as a whole before trying to address 
some key points individually.
(a) Outline
Qohelet begins with a declaration of his themes: ‘Vapour of 
vapours! … Vapour of vapours! It is all vapour! What profit is there 
for a human in any of his business, at which he works beneath the 
sun?’ (1.1–3). We shall look shortly at the meaning of hebel, the 
term that I have translated ‘vapour’ here: suffice it to say that the 
vapour which concerns him is immediately linked to human activity 
in these verses. Qohelet, however, pursues neither his statement nor 
his question straight away. Instead, he presents two very different 
blocks of evidence that will form the basis for his claims. The first, 
in 1.4–11, begins by contrasting the transience of humans with 
the permanence of the world, and goes on to describe a series of 
phenomena that each in their own way reaches a conclusion, but 
does so repeatedly: a sun that rises and sets, but then rises again to 
do the same, a wind that blows, then blows again, and rivers that run 
into the sea without ever filling it, so continue to run. Even human 
actions can be similar: I take the proper sense of 1.8 to be that we 
do not use words up when we speak, or fill our eyes and ears by 
seeing and hearing (although other commentators commonly see an 
exclamation of wonder here). Qohelet claims, accordingly, that all 
this movement and activity belie a fundamentally static situation, in 
which there is no change and nothing is new: anything that seems 
novel does so only because everything is ultimately forgotten.
In 1.12, there is a significant change of style and tone. Qohelet’s 
second tranche of evidence will be derived from his own experience. 
He begins by summarizing his brief, initial enquiries into the role 
of humans within the world, into the nature of the wisdom that he 
uses to address that issue, and into pleasure. These lead him to find 
human achievements merely vapour, wisdom a source of pain, and 
pleasure pointless. In what I take to be a second phase, therefore, 
he sets out to undertake a much longer experiment in 2.3–10, which 
involves constructing a whole business and livelihood for himself, 
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and enables him also to enjoy a luxurious, wealthy lifestyle. When 
he comes to assess the results of this in 2.11, however, he finds that 
it too is vapour, which has failed to grant him the sort of profit that 
he really wants.
It is from the results of this experiment that Qohelet’s insights and 
ideas begin to flow. In the first place, he understands that his wisdom 
has not really done him any good. It has made him no profit, and 
since he will die just like a fool, his earlier accumulation of wisdom 
was just another vapour: in a reference back to 1.11, he suggests 
that people forget about such equality at death because they forget 
about everything. With regard to this, it is important for us to be 
aware that Qohelet (like at least most of his contemporaries) has no 
belief in an afterlife where the dead might be rewarded or punished, 
or might even be fully conscious (cf. 9.10), so if there is any profit 
to be gained at all by humans, it must be while they are alive.
The reason why Qohelet feels that he has made no profit, despite 
becoming wealthy, is not stated explicitly: 2.11 says merely that 
when he turns to examine his achievements, he finds them to be 
vapour, and declares that there is ‘no profit under the sun’. His 
understanding becomes clearer in 2.12b, however, and then in 
2.18–23, when, after talking about the implications for the useful-
ness of wisdom, he goes on to spell out the problem that his 
business will outlast him and pass to somebody else (so is not really 
his). The more immediate concern that pre-occupies him in these 
verses, though, is that the business may pass to somebody who may 
have no wisdom, and who may have done nothing to earn it. Corre-
spondingly, he comes to understand in 2.24 that the qualities and 
situations of individual humans are not connected directly to their 
own character, but are a matter of divine dispensation—and in 2.26 
he probably goes on to reject the idea that they are straightforwardly 
a result of reward and punishment.
There is another significant change of style at the beginning of 
ch. 3, but the ideas here mark a continuation. The famous sequence 
of paired actions in 3.2–8 has attracted various interpretations. I 
share the view that it makes the point (drawn out in 3.10–11) that 
anything humans do must be good in its time, because everything 
that humans do is ordained by God. By implication, humans make 
no real decisions, and no action can be inherently bad. All that 
humans can do for themselves is to take pleasure and seek to do 
good (3.12). In 3.9–15, Qohelet again refers back to 1.4–11, but he 
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now links the permanence of the world and the ignorance of humans 
to divine action: God maintains that permanence and conceals his 
achievements from humans, so that he provokes their fear, and God 
is responsible for every genuine initiative.
By 3.15, therefore, Qohelet has established a particular under-
standing of human life within the world, and presented his reasons 
for that understanding: his investigations have led him to under-
stand that humans misapprehend the nature of a world about which 
they can know little, and so believe that they can achieve more 
for themselves than is actually possible. Everything they do is in 
fact done on behalf of God, and nothing that they achieve is really 
achieved by or for themselves. There are some chinks left open in 
this. Most notably, at 2.10 Qohelet observes that he found pleasure 
in the creation of his business, and that this was in some sense his 
‘share’—an idea that is picked up again in 3.12–13, where such 
pleasure is described as a gift or payment from God, and that is 
going to become a very prominent concern as the monologue goes 
on. Such pleasure is not, in Qohelet’s terms, a ‘profit’ that can 
balance out the expenditure of effort involved in living, but it is at 
least some compensation for all the work and hardship. In 3.12–13 
this is also set alongside an idea of ‘doing good in one’s life’, which 
is not explained, but which perhaps indicates an idea that, even if 
humans cannot control their actions and outcomes, they have some 
responsibility for their motives.
After 3.15, Qohelet continues to draw further conclusions and 
to make new observations, but in a less clearly structured way. The 
first of these are very important. In 3.16–17, he affirms, despite the 
deterministic worldview that he has just espoused, and apparently 
despite the evidence of his own eyes, that God will judge humans. 
In the obscure 3.18–22, he also insists, probably in connection with 
this judgment, that humans are different from animals, even though 
the visible evidence makes the death, and so the nature, of both 
seem identical. These are significant counterweights to what he 
has said previously, insofar as they represent dogmatic beliefs that 
Qohelet holds despite the evidence, not apparent deductions from 
his investigations. They also, though, develop further his theme that 
the appearance of the world is misleading, and that what humans 
actually see can lead them to misunderstand their situation. In 3.22, 
commending pleasure in one’s achievements again, he adds the 
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observation, which will be repeated often, that nobody can see what 
will happen after them, and this is another aspect of the problem: we 
do not understand the world, and so our place in it, but we also have 
no way to adapt our behaviour to a hidden future, perhaps by trying 
to leave some mark behind us.
Much of what follows defies summary, and Qohelet explores 
a number of different areas. Sometimes he explicitly elaborates 
upon or qualifies the core ideas that he has set out in the first three 
chapters, and he retains a particular interest in the issues of what is 
good for humans, of wisdom, and of pleasure, which were set out 
programmatically in 1.12–2.2. Often, though, he merely brings his 
own, very distinct perspective to bear on topics that are tangential 
to these issues—among the declarations that follow swiftly after 
ch. 3, we find, for instance, the value of other people assessed by 
4.9–12 purely in terms of material advantage (warmth, rather than 
any other reason, is notably offered as the motivation to share a bed 
with someone), while 4.17–5.6 depict communications with God as 
an avoidable risk, and sacrifice as something that only fools have 
to do.
Very broadly speaking, chs. 4 and 5 cover various aspects of 
human life—our relationships with other humans, with God, and 
with wealth. From 5.12, a series of examples, or parables, take up 
this last theme, and provide an opportunity for Qohelet to empha-
size from various angles his understanding that wealth means 
nothing without the ability, granted by God, to take satisfaction 
from what one has; ch. 6 concludes with affirmations that humans 
have no power to challenge their situation or to understand their 
own lives. In the more miscellaneous 7.1–8.9, the principal theme 
is wisdom, which we shall look at in more detail below, and the 
monologue includes a further passage of memoir, but 7.13–18 do 
pick up earlier interests again, and include the provocative sugges-
tion that we should not be more righteous or wise than needs be, and 
that it is simply fear of God that will get us through, while 8.2–5a 
depict the dangers of royal anger—perhaps to make a similar point 
about fear. The fear of God recurs again in 8.10–17, where Qohelet 
reiterates and builds upon his points that what we see of the world 
may mislead us, that there is nothing good for us except to find 
pleasure in what we do, and that God deliberately hides his achieve-
ments—which even the wise will be unable to discover.
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The beginning of ch. 9 seems to mark a sort of break, in which 
Qohelet mulls over his observations in order to draw conclusions 
about the divine control of both righteous and wicked, and the 
human inability to understand God’s attitude to them when everyone 
seems to meet the same fate—a problem that leads them to behave 
badly and to cling to life. In 9.7–10, this culminates in Qohelet’s 
strongest and most famous statement of his belief that we should find 
pleasure in what we do, backed by a claim that our work has already 
been accepted by God. In 9.11 Qohelet then introduces a new idea 
of unpredictability, linked to his beliefs about human ignorance, but 
also probably drawing on the problem of undifferentiated outcomes: 
time and chance can affect everybody, while nobody knows when 
their time will come—in a chilling image, humans are like trapped 
birds or netted fish, awaiting the return of the hunter.
This idea may be picked up in the difficult 10.5–10, but those 
verses are followed by what seems to be a series of miscellaneous 
sayings up to the beginning of ch. 11, where Qohelet apparently 
warns against over-cautiousness in the face of ignorance: if we try 
to predict what is happening, we will never accomplish anything. 
From 11.7, this becomes a further commendation to enjoy life and 
find pleasure, motivated by an awareness of coming death, and in 
12.3–5 Qohelet describes a death in a household (often interpreted 
as an allegory of old age). Even as the corpse goes to its grave, 
however, this is against the background of a fertile natural world 
that will go on, taking us back to 1.4, and after a short sequence 
of images that highlight the violence and wastefulness of death, 
Qohelet finally repeats his declaration that ‘everything is vapour’.
It should be very apparent from all of this that we are not dealing 
with a carefully structured argument in the monologue, and even 
in the first three chapters there is sometimes more rhetoric than 
logic behind Qohelet’s claims. It should also be evident, however, 
that Qohelet’s ideas are cumulative: most of the assertions that he 
makes in later chapters depend on points that he has already made, 
and there is a deliberate effort early in the book to lay a ground-
work, to which Qohelet himself not infrequently appeals. If we 
elaborate a little less than he does, the basic assumptions can be 
stated straightforwardly: activity within the world all contributes 
toward endless processes that are under the control of God, and 
human actions are no exception. Although they expend effort in 
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living, therefore, nothing that humans achieve is achieved simply 
for themselves. This means both that they receive no permanent, 
material compensation for their efforts—making it impossible to 
‘profit’ from their work—and that their situation in life is a result 
of divine intentions rather than of their own worthiness. Humans 
have no insight into the larger processes within which their lives 
are lived, and this leads to a series of problems: they do not know 
what will happen or understand what is happening, which can lead 
them to draw false conclusions and to pursue pointless ambitions. 
In the face of all this, the best they can do to offset the cost of their 
efforts is to try to find pleasure in them, while the only way that 
they can deal with the uncertainties is to treat God with the respect 
that he wants, and in the expectation that he will ultimately act with 
justice.
In fact, Qohelet devotes relatively little space to his practical 
suggestions for coping with the situation in which humans find 
themselves, and much of his emphasis is instead on his own 
observations and, as we shall see, on the problems that surround 
human perception. If he actually does believe all this, however, 
then some of his early statements and actions seem puzzling. Why 
would he seek to find a good in human efforts, for example (2.3), 
when his understandings of the world and of profit would seem to 
preclude such a possibility almost by definition? And why would 
he have accumulated wisdom (1.16) when the unknowability of the 
world so limits its usefulness? Qohelet, indeed, asks himself that 
question in 2.15, shortly after declaring the impossibility of profit 
in 2.11, and it seems clear that we must reckon with a develop-
ment in his ways of looking at the world. Another, more positive 
aspect of this is reflected in the emphasis that he comes to place 
on pleasure, which he had dismissed as useless in 2.1. As I have 
suggested above, therefore, we have to see a narrative dimension 
to Qohelet’s account from 1.12 onwards, and I doubt that his intel-
lectual development is restricted to the first two chapters: a further 
short memoir in ch. 7 seems to suggest, as we shall see, that he has 
continued to move on.19 Since his account of the world in 1.4–11 
19  As Mills says in Reading Ecclesiastes, 20, ‘Qohelet, the older sage, waits 
at the end of the story for his younger self to develop and achieve that breadth 
of experience which will produce the final moral vision of the narration’. Segal 
20 ECCLESIASTES
seems to embody many of his fully fledged beliefs, however, it is 
also likely that we are supposed to regard those verses as a sort of 
prelude. To make his case, Qohelet presents a particular perspective 
on the world, then an account of his experiences, but for this second 
approach to addressing the points in 1.2–3, he steps backward to a 
time when he first became king, according to 1.12, and when he did 
not yet have that perspective, then shows us how he came to gain it.
(b) The hebel Statements
I have already mentioned the way that a certain unity is imposed on 
the monologue by, to use the traditional translation for a moment, 
statements about the ‘vanity’ of various phenomena, which tie into 
the programmatic declarations at 1.2 and 12.8, that ‘everything is 
vanity’. In the form ‘This (also) is vanity’, such statements occur 
nineteen times, in 1.14; 2.1, 11 (twice), 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26; 
4.4, 8, 16; 5.9; 6.2, 9; 7.6; 8.10, 14. Among these, 4.7–8 and 8.14 
introduce a situation as ‘a vanity’, and then subsequently describe 
it again, using the more formulaic comment. Rarely, Qohelet 
also makes pronouncements using the ‘this (also) is…wording, 
but without using ‘vanity’ at all (cf. 1.17; 5.15). Clearly, these 
statements are supposed to draw out and embody some or all of 
Qohelet’s key ideas, and the Hebrew word hebel, which lies behind 
the traditional translation, also appears outside them. So 3.19 uses 
‘for everything is hebel’ as support for an assertion, rather than as 
a description, while in 11.8 Qohelet claims that ‘everything which 
comes is hebel’, and in 11.10 calls youth hebel. In the difficult 
5.7, the plural of this noun is used in conjunction with dreams and 
words, and 6.11 also identifies hebel as a product of speech. In 
6.12, 7.15 and 9.9, we find hebel used attributively to characterize 
lives, or the days of one’s life, and in 6.4 it is associated with the 
circumstances into which a premature child is born. Not surpris-
ingly, translators have struggled to find any English word that fits 
all of these contexts, but, more importantly, commentators have 
also failed to reach any consensus over the principal connotation of 
devotes a whole discussion (107–12) to change within the book, observing (107) 
that, ‘Set against Kohelet’s observations of an un-understandable, unchangeable 
world is the man himself, who ever so subtly grows and develops. It is he who 
changes; he is not at the end of the book who he was at the beginning.’
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hebel in the book (Meek, ‘Readings’, offers a helpful overview of 
the various opinions).
The basic sense of the word is unproblematic, and the difficulty 
lies in the fact that Qohelet uses it metaphorically: hebel is connected 
in some way with air, or the movement of air (which is why I trans-
lated it earlier as ‘vapour’), and this literal sense probably underpins 
both Isa 57.13, where wind and hebel will together snatch something 
away, and the second part of Ps 62.10 (  62.9), where humans 
are even lighter on the scales than hebel. It is difficult to be more 
precise than that, although we may reasonably presume that hebel 
must have been differentiated from simple nothingness, or from 
air itself (if that was a concept familiar to the original audience) 
by some quality of movement, temperature or effect. Post-biblical 
usage, in fact, does suggest that hebel is typically exhaled or exuded 
in some way: the word, or its Aramaic cognate, is used of breath, 
vapour, the hot air from cooking, and the lethal miasma of a pit or a 
marsh. The notions of hot air, breath or exhalation are not excluded 
by the passages from Isaiah and Psalm 62, while there may even be 
a play between literal and figurative meanings in Job 35.16, where 
it is hebel, ‘hot air’, that is said by Elihu to open Job’s mouth, when 
‘without knowledge he multiplies words’. There is no good reason 
to suppose, therefore, that the underlying idea in biblical usage 
was very different from that in post-biblical Hebrew, and strictly 
speaking, then, Qohelet is declaring everything to be ‘hot air’, 
‘vapour’, or something similar.
Of course, it may be as misleading to leave metaphors untrans-
lated as to substitute an interpretation, and if there were any 
evidence hebel had acquired a fixed sense or connotation other 
than ‘vapour’ in biblical Hebrew, then by leaving it un translated we 
would risk opening the term up to a wider range of interpretations 
than the author might originally have intended.20 It does not seem 
20  Although he speaks of it as being used metaphorically, Fredericks, in Coping, 
15, sees attempts to understand hebel in terms of vapour as ‘etymological’, and 
Good, Irony, 177, speaks of vapour as the ‘etymological basis’ of the noun. Such 
descriptions are misleading: even were we to suppose that the metaphor had come 
to convey a fixed sense, we would not normally understand hebel in that sense to 
be a new word, etymologically derived from hebel as vapour. This understanding 
apparently frees Good to pursue his rendering of hebel in terms of ‘irony’, an 
understanding derived entirely from contextual considerations, which Polk, ‘The 
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likely, however, that hebel ever settled down to convey any single 
meaning, and so, for example, Ps 144.4 is able to use hebel as a 
figure for transience and insignificance, while Isa 30.7 uses it of 
‘useless’ or ‘insubstantial’ Egyptian aid, and Prov 31.30 contrasts 
beauty in a woman with piety, calling it hebel in order to evoke both 
insignificance and transience together. Although hebel may have 
come to have certain particular connotations or extended meanings, 
the biblical evidence suggests that, on the whole, it remained very 
much a live metaphor, through which writers could use the figure of 
breath or vapour to convey, separately or simultaneously, a variety 
of ideas.21
Naturally, these associations largely flow from the nature and 
characteristics of ‘vapour’ itself, which is ephemeral, and which can 
have a presence or existence while possessing no actual substance 
or ability to affect anything—it has been suggested that a compa-
rable figure in English might be ‘a bubble’ (Burkitt, ‘Is Ecclesiastes 
a Translation?’, 28; cf. Zimmerli, Die Weisheit, 16). In a few places, 
however, the imagery seems to depend not on the nature of vapour 
itself, but on the nature of interactions with vapour, which can be 
felt but not grasped, or can be blown at people, so that it is a source 
of confusion or frustration (see, e.g., Ps 39.7 [  39.6], where 
the word cannot imply the same as in the preceding verse, or Job 
27.12). A verb derived from the noun has corresponding implica-
tions of confusion or deception: it is used of being misguided (Ps 
62.11 [  62.10]) or of misleading others (Jer 23.16), and the noun 
perhaps takes on this connotation where it is used with the verb 
(2 Kgs 17.15; cf. Jer 2.5; Job 27.12).
Given the wide range of possible meanings that can be attached 
to such a metaphor, it seems likely that the original audience would 
have to have been guided to Qohelet’s intended sense by their 
understanding of the contexts in which he uses it. An important 
clue is also offered, however, by the way he links hebel to other 
expressions from an early point, and most notably to the alliterative 
descriptions rĕʿût rûaḥ and raʿyôn rûaḥ, which are found a number 
Wisdom of Irony’, 8, rightly criticizes as based on an idea that ‘words are simply 
empty ciphers, completely dependent upon context to fill them with sense’ 
(although he himself sees irony as central to Qohelet’s message).
21  See especially Miller, ‘Qohelet’s Symbolic Use of הבל’, and his Symbol and 
Rhetoric.
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of times (see 1.14; 2.11, 17, 26; 4.4, 6; 6.9; and 1.17; 4.16).22 The 
sense of these is not itself entirely undisputed, but the second word 
in each, the common term rûaḥ, is itself used of breath or wind, and 
the link with hebel suggests that a similar metaphor of air is being 
used. Neither rĕʿût nor raʿyôn appears as a Hebrew word elsewhere 
in biblical literature, but both do appear there as Aramaic words: 
rĕʿût with reference to royal and divine wishes or decisions in Ezra 
(5.17; 7.18), and raʿyôn referring to thoughts or worries in Daniel 
(2.29, 30; 4.16 [  4.19]; 5.6, 10; 7.28). Since there are many other 
connections with Aramaic in Ecclesiastes, it is hard to ignore these 
established uses, and they point to rĕʿût rûaḥ meaning something 
like ‘wishing for wind’, and raʿyôn rûaḥ either the same, or possibly 
‘worrying about wind’—although, since rûaḥ can also mean ‘spirit’, 
they could alternatively connote ‘wishing’ and ‘worrying’ by one’s 
spirit, and there may even be a play on both senses.23
The more precise implications of these expressions may be 
apparent from other usage: 5.15 uses a similar figure of ‘toiling 
for rûaḥ’ either to describe the zero net gain of a human at death, 
or with ironic reference to their (ultimately pointless) reasons for 
working. This understanding is compatible with the one occasion 
when raʿyôn appears in Ecclesiastes without rûaḥ: in 2.22 the 
raʿyôn of a human heart is set beside physical toil, in a context 
which suggests that it means mental labour, ambition, or anxiety. 
This verse might be compared with 4.6, which does not use rĕʿût 
rûaḥ as a simple comment on a situation, in the normal way, but 
again links it with physical toil, counting both as less desirable than 
a little tranquility. Such references suggest that we are dealing with 
a way of talking about human motivation and pre-occupation, and 
both expressions apparently connote some sort of pointless anxiety, 
22  It is possible that whereas the traditional Hebrew text has two expressions, 
the other ancient versions were based on texts which had only rĕʿût rûaḥ: see the 
note at 1.14.
23  Hosea 12.2 uses the expression  רוח קדים in parallel with רעה   chases‘ ,רדף 
the East wind’, and the Hebrew verb רע ה there probably means ‘herds, shepherds’: 
the meaning of the imagery is not entirely clear, but it is associated with the 
Northern Kingdom’s betrayal of God and cultivation of relationships with Assyria 
and Egypt, so perhaps conveys an idea of effort that will ultimately prove futile. 
Several of the ancient translations connect Qohelet’s usage with רעה, probably 
because of this passage, but if they are right to do so, the sense is probably similar 
to that derived from the Aramaic.
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desire (‘wishful thinking’), or even labour. This suits the context of 
Qohelet’s initial statements about hebel, which throughout 1.2–2.11 
is associated with human efforts, and it seems highly likely that the 
use in conjunction with these other expressions would have led the 
audience to think of the broader hebel metaphor, at least initially, in 
terms of futility and pointless aspiration, rather than of, say, transi-
ence or any of its other established implications.
Without going through all the instances in detail here, it becomes 
clear as the book progresses that when Qohelet singles out particular 
situations as hebel, he is not referring to precisely the same sort of 
issue in every case. What the various situations do seem to have in 
common, however, is that they each involve a problem of human 
perception or expectation: an activity or a phenomenon is hebel 
when humans are driven to think or act in some way by a false 
or faulty apprehension of what they are doing. Typically, it is the 
misguided action or effort itself which attracts the description, but 
Qohelet also uses hebel to describe situations which can or do cause 
such misguidedness, because humans misinterpret what they see in 
them—the prosperity of a man who will not enjoy it, for instance 
(6.2), or the continuing good health of the wicked, which conceals 
the fact of divine judgment (8.10–14). To put that in the terms of the 
metaphor itself, what Qohelet sees in each case is something like 
an attempt to return the touch of a breath of wind on our skin, and 
the broader expectation of humans that they can grasp what they 
can sense.24 When he talks in 2.15, for instance, about his own past 
24  It is tempting to compare a well-known Greek analogy. Monimus of 
Syracuse, who was active in the fourth century , is reputed to have claimed 
that  τῦφος τὰ πάντα, perhaps literally ‘Everything is smoke’—a claim that i s 
naturally reminiscent of Qohelet’s belief that ‘Everything is hebel’. Where this 
claim is preserved much later in Sextus Empiricus, Πρὸς λογικούς (Against the 
Logicians), it is glossed as οἴησις τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ὡς ὄντων, loosely ‘trying to 
treat things that don’t exist as though they did exist’. The term τῦφος, to be sure, 
may already have lost much of its metaphorical quality, if it ever possessed such: 
the cognate verb is used of smoking, but the noun seems to have drawn its sense 
of ‘delusion’ or ‘self-satisfaction’ from its use to describe fevers and delirium. I 
doubt, furthermore, that Monimus was directly an influence on Ecclesiastes, as is 
sometimes suggested (e.g. by Amir, ‘Doch ein griechischer Einfluss?’), let alone 
that Qohelet’s claims are intended specifically to echo Monimus (as Köhlmoos 
claims at 1.2): the Greek debate about reality and knowability is conducted at a 
much greater level of abstraction and generalization than is Qohelet’s discourse. 
All the same, Monimus makes a point that is very similar to Qohelet’s, about the 
 INTRODUCTION 25
efforts to be wise, which are now revealed to have gained him no 
real advantage over the fool, the illusion lies in the false or thought-
less expectations that had motivated him, while in 5.9 it lies in the 
pursuit by others of a fulfilment that they will never find.
This mismatch between expectation and reality may induce a 
sense of frustration or futility, but hebel does not in itself describe 
that sense, and those whose motivations are hebel (in Qohelet’s 
view, at least) may never realize that fact for themselves. If the 
elusiveness of air is a key element of the metaphor, moreover, 
that quality does not adequately describe Qohelet’s use of it: the 
problems that he sees lie not simply in the qualities of hebel, but 
in the false expectations that it can engender. An appreciation of 
this underpins what has certainly been the most influential modern 
interpretation of hebel and Qohelet’s description of situations as 
hebel, which draws on existentialist ideas of ‘absurdity’, and which 
is especially associated with the work of Michael Fox. According to 
this understanding:
Underlying Qohelet’s hebel-judgments is an assumption that the 
system should be rational, which, for Qohelet, means that actions 
should invariably produce appropriate consequences. In fact, 
Qohelet stubbornly expects them to do so. Qohelet believes in the 
rule of divine justice. That is why he does not merely resign himself 
to the violations of equity he observes. He is shocked by them: they 
clash with his belief that the world must work equitably. These viola-
tions are offensive to reason. They are absurd. (Fox, ‘The Meaning 
of Hebel for Qohelet’, 426)
This captures very well the mismatch between expectations and 
reality that seems to be embodied in Qohelet’s use of hebel as 
a metaphor, but it also imports ideas that are expressed directly 
nowhere else in the book, and ignores some that are. As we have 
seen, Qohelet believes strongly in divine judgment, but also in 
divine control of events: when he sees circumstances that seem to 
stand in contradiction to the former, it drives him to emphasize the 
latter. Correspondingly, the problem in a passage like 8.10–14 is not 
that the world is irrational, but that what humans can perceive of 
inability of humans to distinguish what is real, and it might not be inappropriate 
to suggest that, if such ideas had any more general currency when the book was 
written, they would have informed the audience’s understanding of Qohelet’s 
claims.
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God’s work does not enable them to understand it, so that their own 
reasoning and subsequent behaviour is based on a false perception. 
In, say, 5.18–6.2, on the other hand, the illusion lies in the identical 
appearance of those who can enjoy what they have and those who 
cannot. To be sure, this means that from a human perspective the 
world or things within it may seem bent or crooked (cf. 1.15; 
7.13)—and the fact of possession without enjoyment is a hard 
thing for humans to put up with (cf. 6.1). The essence of Qohelet’s 
message, however, is not that the world is working wrongly, but 
that humans cannot see it properly—because it is clearly no part 
of God’s intention that they should do so. To that extent, nobody 
and nothing—least of all ‘the system’—is irrational or at fault. 
The individual mismatches of expectation that Qohelet isolates are 
merely symptomatic of the fact that ‘all is hebel’, and that human 
understandings must necessarily be based on information that is 
limited, and potentially misleading.
There is a relationship between this and existentialist conceptions 
of the absurd, and it is not at all inappropriate to read Ecclesiastes in 
dialogue with such approaches to the problem of human existence 
in the world—indeed, it would not be wholly anachronistic to say 
that, in some important respects, Qohelet addresses key issues of 
existentialism in ways that would not be entirely alien to that tradi-
tion.25 The translation of hebel as ‘absurdity’ helps to bring out such 
connections, but at the same time it potentially imputes to 
Qohelet, certainly in Fox’s understanding, a view of the cosmos as 
25  The link is made explicitly in a popular article that appeared shortly 
before Fox’s: James, ‘Ecclesiastes: Precursor of Existentialists’, which examines 
it, however, only in a very general way, and around the same time Schwartz, 
‘Koheleth and Camus’, compared Ecclesiastes with Camus’ portrayal of Sisyphus 
(although he noted differences between them). The issue had been in the air a 
long time, though: well before all these, and in 1968, the same year that Barucq 
pre-empted Fox by characterizing hebel as ‘absurdité’ (as Pennacchini, ‘Qohelet’, 
was later also to do in 1977), Gordis devoted a chapter of his third edition 
(111–121) to denying the validity of such comparisons. Ingram, Ambiguity, 96 
n. 25, mentions some other works, and there is a useful list of studies in Gericke, 
‘Comprehensive Typology’, 3–4, to which we might add Christianson, ‘Existential 
Legacy’, a powerful reading that looks at existential attitudes to the holocaust. 
Among those who oppose the comparison, Shuster, ‘Being as Breath’, explicitly 
rejects existentialism in favour of a comparison with Heidegger, and Sneed, 
Politics of Pessimism, 168–70, declares that Qohelet is ‘no modern existentialist’, 
while Ehlich, ‘Metaphern’, 59–61, offers some thoughtful qualifications.
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meaningless or irrational that he would only hold if he believed God 
himself to be irrational.26 What he actually seems to believe, rather, 
is simply that humans try to live meaningfully in a world that is itself 
meaningful, but are prevented from aligning themselves properly to 
that world by the limits of their own perception27—a belief, that, as 
we shall see, leads him to emphasize the limits of human wisdom.
It is difficult always to exclude other nuances in some places, 
and in 9.9, for instance, hebel surely carries some additional or even 
alternative implication that human life is ephemeral and transitory.28 
What hebel seems principally to represent for Qohelet, however, is 
bound up with this misapprehension by humans of the world, and 
26  On the pursuit of meaning that Fox sees as a counterpart to the declarations 
of absurdity, see his ‘Inner-Structure’. The same issue can be raised, I think, in 
respect of Rudman’s idea (in ‘The Use of הבל’) that the various implications of 
hebel are linked by the idea of chaos, and that Qoheleth ‘believed the world was 
under the dominion of chaos’ (141).
27  Haden, ‘Qoheleth’, discusses the issues usefully in terms of ‘alienation’ 
and ‘epistemic distance’, making the important point also that, as Qohelet’s own 
declarations about God show, God in the book is not supposed to be wholly 
unknowable—although he then goes on to attribute to Qohelet a theology that is 
more conventional, I think, than the text itself suggests. It is also interesting to 
compare Atkinson’s summary of an emphasis found in the interpretations both of 
Bonaventure and of Luther: ‘the problem Solomon is confronting is not creation in 
itself, but the way in which humanity sees it and responds to it in word and deed’ 
(Singing, 191; his italics).
28  Fredericks, Coping, sees this as the primary sense, while allowing for other 
nuances elsewhere. Against readings that permit various implications, Fox argues 
(35–6) that hebel cannot have different meanings in different places ‘because then 
the summary “All is hebel” would be meaningless. Indeed, it would be specious 
reasoning or a rhetorical device—arguing from disparate categories that share 
only a multivalent label.’ That is fair so long as it is not taken too far: we could 
equally argue that Qohelet is indeed more rhetor than logician, and that the use of 
a multivalent metaphor permits him to conjure a unity that would be impossible 
were his language more precise. Were we to insist, on the other hand, that he is 
genuinely trying to make an argument here, then we should also need to bear in 
mind that hebel lends itself to the sort of equivocation, intentional or otherwise, 
that is found repeatedly even in the works of Plato. Reviewing various translations 
of hebel, Alter, Wisdom Books, 340, offers the important reminder that ‘all of 
these English equivalents are more or less right, and abstractions being what they 
are, each one has the effect of excluding the others and thus limiting the scope of 
the Hebrew metaphor’. Alter accordingly opts to retain that metaphor in his own 
translation, rendering the noun as ‘mere breath’, but I am not sure that that has 
the same range of resonances for a modern audience that hebel would have had 
for an ancient one.
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of their place within it: they invest effort for things they cannot 
gain, or for reasons which are false, while they fail to pursue or 
to accomplish the only truly beneficial option which is open to 
them—pleasure in their activities—either because their concerns 
lie elsewhere, or because they have been misled into behaviour 
which may shorten their lives or prevent their enjoyment. What 
confronts humans is hebel because it is misleading or illusory, but 
what they typically do in response to it is also hebel because it is 
miguided or deluded. Without an equivalent, established metaphor 
in English, it is difficult to translate hebel in a way that reflects all 
the different nuances, even if we are willing to sacrifice the conti-
nuity of Qohelet’s usage by adopting different terms in different 
contexts. The idea of an illusion, however, and of corresponding 
human delusion or confusion, comes close to catching the sense of 
hebel both in Ecclesiastes and in many of the other texts where it is 
used, so I have generally adopted those in my translation.29
Beyond the issue of meaning and translation, though, it is impor-
tant also to appreciate the function of hebel as a unifying structural 
device, which holds much of the monologue together while simulta-
neously serving to separate particular observations and discussions 
from each other. It is striking, therefore, although rarely remarked 
upon until quite recently,30 that Qohelet continues to use the word 
29  I would distinguish this from the interpretation in terms of epistemological 
scepticism which Michel, Untersuchungen, 40–51, adopts (on that, see Lohfink, 
 Aussage’) and Seow’s comparable idea that Qohelet is depicting the world-הבל‘
as imprehensible (see ‘Beyond’, 15–16). Fisch, ‘Constructive Skepticism’, 
understands the issue in similar terms, but prefers to think in terms of the 
‘tentativity’ with which humans are forced to act, unable to achieve certainty in 
the world. He speaks of Qohelet’s problem (177) as ‘divining…the possibility, 
meaning and prospects of rational and progressive action in conditions of thorough 
(epistemic) uncertainty’. Qohelet’s use of the term, I think, expresses not his belief 
that humans cannot know reality, so much as his belief that they misapprehend it, 
and that it lends itself to such misapprehension. A significant part of the problem 
is that they do not always, or even usually, recognize the limitations, and so do not 
act, perhaps, as tentatively as they should.
30   Carrière, ‘Tout est vanité’, extrapolates a pattern in Qohelet’s use of the 
word from Wright’s observation (in ‘‘The Riddle of the Sphinx Revisited’, 44), 
that the numerical value of hebel (5+2+30–37) is equal to the number of times 
it occurs in the book. His numerological suggestions are unconvincing (and we 
may note that Wright’s original count required him to delete one use as secondary, 
which Carrière does not); the divisions that he imposes also seem arbitrary. 
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after 8.14, but stops using his ‘This (also) is hebel’ formula at that 
point, with some four chapters of the book still to go. The simplest 
explanation for this, of course, would be that after this point, the 
monologue no longer introduces new situations or phenomena that 
Qohelet wants to characterize this way, and it is certainly true that 
what immediately follows (at least up to 9.12) could be understood 
as a sort of summary or extrapolation. We might perhaps have 
expected some such statement in connection with 9.13–15, but 
Qohelet instead derives from that a series of sayings about wisdom, 
and after this, down to ch. 12, his speech consists mostly of sayings 
and admonitions, with only occasional observations of situations 
that might earlier have attracted the formula. Without putting too 
much weight on the absence, it might be reasonable to suggest that 
the cessation of this formula is a structural device in itself, as much 
as was its presence in the earlier chapters: towards the end of the 
book we move into a phase where Qohelet is no longer concerned 
to draw out the misperceptions that lie behind human situations and 
behaviour, but to draw some wider conclusions and to offer some 
broader, more miscellaneous advice that loosely relates to those 
conclusions. Segal (108) notes the disappearance of the first-person 
perspective toward the end of the monologue (after 9.13, the only 
first-person suffix is in 12.1, where it does not refer to Qohelet, and 
the independent pronoun last appears in 9.16; the last first-person 
verb is in 10.7): this perhaps also reflects the extent to which the 
discourse shifts away from the personal engagement and examina-
tion that turned earlier chapters more visibly into a quest.
Carrière does, however, draw attention to the shift in Qohelet’s discourse, and the 
more varied uses of hebel in the last chapters. Ingram, Ambiguity, 127–28, sets out 
in detail the uneven distribution of the term, and Segal picks this up as an instance 
of change within the monologue (108), going on to suggest (136–37) that there is a 
shift away from using it to characterize situations, and toward using it as a way to 
describe the fleetingness of life (cf. 6.12; 7.15; 9.9). I am myself inclined to think 
that this is indicative more of changes in the content than of some attempt to depict 
Qohelet becoming ‘less enamored of the word’ (136), although those changes may 
themselves, of course, be an aspect of Qohelet’s characterization. Gianto, ‘Theme 
of Enjoyment’, argues that the change after 8.14 marks the gradual emergence of 
pleasure as an alternative to the reality of hebel, which seems to place too much 
weight on that particular theme in the closing chapters, but may be closer to the 
mark.
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(c) Wisdom
Word distributions and frequencies are not always a very useful 
way to approach a text, but given Qohelet’s undoubted concern 
with wisdom, it is interesting to observe just where he uses terms 
from the relevant Hebrew root ḤKM. These appear no fewer than 
53 times, across 44 of the book’s 222 verses (although two are in 
the epilogue at 12.9 and 11, so are not actually uses by Qohelet 
himself), and this frequency is similar to that found in the book 
of Proverbs, which is around two-and-a-half times longer and 
has 104 occurrences—it is slightly higher, if anything. Of course, 
wisdom is not always his focus when Qohelet uses the vocabulary 
of wisdom, but it would be fair to say that Qohelet refers to no other 
of his preoccupations so often—hebel appears an impressive 38 
times, but eight of these are in 1.2 and 12.8—and from those raw 
data alone, we might well conclude that Ecclesiastes is very much 
a book about wisdom. The terminology is distributed irregularly, 
however, with the relevant words falling largely in 1.13–2.26 (17 
uses), 7.4–8.5 (16), and 9.10–10.12 (13). Around 90% of Qohelet’s 
own uses, therefore, are to be found in less than 40% of the verses 
in the monologue, and all the way between the end of ch. 2 and the 
beginning of ch. 7, such vocabulary only appears twice: at 4.13, 
where wisdom is an attribute of the youth but not the issue at stake, 
and at 6.8, where Qohelet apparently reaches back to 2.13–16 in 
order to draw an analogy.31
This concentration correlates with Qohelet’s concerns in the first 
two chapters, where wisdom is a key tool in his investigations, and 
then a target of his concerns in the angry reflections that follow. 
In ch. 7 through to the beginning of ch. 8, moreover, wisdom is 
itself the principal topic of Qohelet’s discourse. It is difficult to 
generalize about the second half of ch. 9 and the first of ch. 10, but 
wisdom and the wise appear in lists at 9.10–11, and most of the 
other uses are in sayings about wisdom. We find a lot of references 
to wisdom, in other words, when Qohelet is talking either about the 
31  It is harder to judge the 36 uses of the verb y dʿ, ‘know’, because Qohelet 
does not use it typically of human knowledge in some more general way, but of 
things that he or others know. The cognate noun dʿt, however, is commonly used 
in association with ‘wisdom’, and has a similar distribution (it appears in 1.16, 18; 
2.21, 26; 7.12; 9.10; 12.9).
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experiences that shaped his views or when wisdom itself is at the 
centre of his attention, but the concept is notably rare in the middle 
of the monologue, where he talks about divine action and human 
behaviour.
After such a virtual absence of references in chs. 3–6, the way 
Qohelet then deals with wisdom in ch. 7 is all the more intriguing. 
Much of this chapter is very difficult to interpret, for various reasons, 
but in 7.1–6 Qohelet presents wisdom in ways that might seem less 
than appealing: where the mind of fools is like a house of celebra-
tion, that of the wise is like a house of mourning, and the wise offer 
rebukes where fools offer songs and laughter. In 7.7, 11–12, and 
probably 19, the power of wisdom is heavily qualified, and, perhaps 
in another reference back to 2.15, 7.16 warns against being unnec-
essarily wise. Qohelet has included wisdom in none of his previous 
recommendations or admonitions, and when he does finally turn 
to it, his commendation is, therefore, lukewarm at best—he makes 
folly sound a lot more appealing. Similar qualifications are attached 
in chs. 9 and 10: the wise are as liable as anyone to suffer the vagaries 
of chance (9.11), wisdom is likely to go unheeded however useful 
it may be (9.13–18), and the benefits of wisdom are contingent on 
the profit or advantage it offers (10.10). In 10.2 and 12–13, to be 
sure, the wise man acts as a foil to the fool, but these are really the 
only points at which Qohelet adopts a conventional attitude towards 
wisdom.
In the course of 7.23–8.1, Qohelet undertakes a quest to find 
wisdom (probably, as we shall see, wisdom personified as a woman), 
and this episode is especially interesting because, up to this point, 
the Qohelet who had so magnified his own wisdom in 1.16 has made 
no subsequent mention of it since 2.15. When he does finally talk 
about that wisdom now, it is no longer in terms of how wise he has 
been: instead, Qohelet declares that he wants to be wise, but finds 
it beyond him. After recounting his failure to discover wisdom, he 
goes on both to speak bitterly of wisdom as a woman who traps men 
when God wills it, and to finish in 8.1, furthermore, with a declaration 
that probably pairs wisdom’s capacity to enlighten with its tendency 
to dishearten. It is not entirely clear how we are supposed to under-
stand all this—and the text is probably damaged at points, making 
the task harder. It seems unlikely, however, either that Qohelet is 
seeking simply to supplement his existing wisdom with some more 
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insightful form of wisdom, or that he has suffered an intellectual 
decline. When the tool with which he made his enquiries in 1.13 
seems now to be utterly beyond his grasp in 7.23–24, the point 
seems rather to be that his reflections have changed his relationship 
with wisdom. We might say that his heart is no longer in it, even if 
he wishes otherwise, although Qohelet himself suggests that he no 
longer feels trapped by wisdom’s own heart: his new incapacity is 
also a form of liberation, and when he sets out to find wisdom, it 
is less to embrace than to accuse her (a point that has been lost in 
the Hebrew text, but not in the Greek). In any case, we shall hear 
nothing more of Qohelet’s own wisdom until the epilogue.
In its treatment both of wisdom generally and of Qohelet’s 
wisdom in particular, the book depicts a significant shift away 
from Qohelet’s enthusiastic embrace of it in 1.12–2.10 toward 
something that we might almost call a loss of faith. At the outset 
of his enquiries, wisdom was not just a tool (1.13; 2.3, 9), but one 
of the primary objects of his investigations (1.17–18; 2.12; 8.16); 
his confidence in wisdom, however, seems to have survived neither 
his immediate conclusions, nor his broader reflections on the 
world—which is hardly surprising once he has come to realize its 
limitations. From an acknowledgment as early as 1.18 that wisdom 
can be a source of pain, Qohelet has realized in 2.13–16 that this 
pain comes with no corresponding gain: wisdom merely allows him 
to perceive his fate more clearly, not to change it. By 8.5–9, his list 
of ‘what the wise man knows’ consists entirely of known unknowns 
and of situations that cannot be changed, while 8.17–9.1 stress both 
that the wise can know no more than anybody else about what God 
has done, and that the wise are as much under God’s control as 
everybody else. Although he never condemns wisdom, therefore, 
and continues occasionally to contrast it favourably with folly, the 
view of the world that Qohelet has developed excludes the possi-
bility that wisdom might ever achieve anything that he regards as 
important.32
32  Sharp, ‘Representation’, 65, suggests: ‘The book is working as hard as it 
possibly can, with rhetorical tools as sophisticated as those one might encounter in 
any work of literature ancient or contemporary, to make the point that “Qohelet’s” 
reliance on wisdom alone is precisely not a viable way to live’.
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(d) The Basis of Qohelet’s Ideas
What we have seen already about the hebel declarations and about 
Qohelet’s attitudes to wisdom merely emphasizes what is surely a 
major theme of the monologue more generally: human ignorance is 
determined by the nature of the world, and by the deliberate design 
of God, with the consequence that human perception is unreliable. 
We may reasonably ask, therefore, on what basis Qohelet presumes 
to offer us his own insights as reliable, and how he can claim to 
know anything about what is supposed to be unknown. Is this 
merely a literary device, which introduces, in effect, an omniscient 
narrator, or is Qohelet’s knowledge plausible despite his denials of 
human knowledge?
The book offers no direct answer to that question, and although 
Qohelet himself has much to say about knowledge and ignorance, 
epistemology itself is nowhere addressed directly as a concern. That 
has not, however, prevented scholars from enquiring into Qohelet’s 
epistemology, and there has been some very important work in this 
area, even if, as is so often the case when we are dealing with Eccle-
siastes, no consensus has been achieved.33 In this respect, some 
issues are complicated by problems surrounding the interpretation 
of particular passages: 7.27 has often been read, for example, in 
terms of inductive reasoning (quite wrongly, I think).34 The principal 
difficulty, however, has proved to be the significance that different 
scholars attach to Qohelet’s many statements about having ‘seen’ 
or ‘observed’ particular phenomena, and to his use of ideas associ-
ated with those observations. In particular, some have been drawn 
33  There is a helpful recent overview of scholarship in Gericke, ‘Comprehensive 
Philosophical Approach’, who notes the more detailed surveys in O’Dowd, The 
Wisdom of Torah, 138–42, and Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 35–60.
34  In fact, a great deal of the discussion in this area has based itself on some 
of the most difficult passages in the book. For details see the commentary and 
notes, but, in short, I doubt that there is any ‘testing’ in 2.1 and 7.23, or that 
Qohelet’s references to ‘finding’ ever imply anything more than ‘encountering’ or 
‘discovering’ (as in 7.29): they do not embody some idea of arriving at a conclusion 
or understanding as the result of calculation. In 7.27, Qohelet is encountering one 
woman after another in the hope or expectation of thereby encountering something 
that he seeks, and although it has become very common to read this as ‘adding 
one thing to another to find the sum’ (as the RSV puts it), such an understanding 
requires us, for no good reason, to insert an extra verb, to read one preposition as 
though it were another, and to imbue the (admittedly difficult) final noun with a 
sense that it possesses clearly nowhere else.
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to see in them an approach that is specifically empirical: Qohelet 
seems to be extrapolating conclusions directly from his experience 
in such cases, not importing them dogmatically or reasoning his 
way to them on the basis of other conclusions.35
If Qohelet were indeed an empiricist at heart, then his conclu-
sions would certainly stand in strong contrast to his methods. In 
most cases where he describes a situation, however, Qohelet seems 
concerned to illustrate his existing beliefs, rather than actually 
to derive any new understanding. The most important potential 
exceptions are in the first two chapters, where he carries out his 
investigations and draws conclusions from them, but these need to 
be read with some caution. In particular, the rejection in 2.11 of his 
own works, and consequently of any possible profit for humans, 
seems not to be derived from his actual experience of building 
businesses—all apparently successful ones—but from his insist-
ence that to qualify as a ‘profit’ what one owns must be something 
that can only be earned, and that can never belong to anybody else 
subsequently.36 His conclusion, in other words, is derived not from 
his experience, but from the application to it of a presupposition. 
Interestingly, what does come out of his experience, according to 
the previous verse, is an appreciation of pleasure, which Qohelet 
had earlier tested experimentally in 2.1 as well: what Qohelet gains 
in these chapters is not a new knowledge validated by experience, 
but an understanding that there can be value in the very act of 
experiencing something.
It is also important to be clear, whatever weight one puts on 
Qohelet’s claims to experience, that much of his worldview is 
35  See, e.g., Fox, ‘Qohelet’s Epistemology’; Piotti, ‘Osservazioni sul Metodo’; 
and, more strongly, Hayman, ‘Qohelet and the Book of Creation’, 98–99; Scium-
bata, ‘Peculiarità e motivazioni’. Schellenberg’s study of Qohelet’s empiricism in 
Erkenntnis, 161–91, leads her to understand his appeals to individual experience 
in terms of his belief that human knowledge is limited to what happens within the 
world, where only experiential and empirical enquiries are possible (196). I am 
more sympathetic to the view of Johnstone, in ‘Preacher as Scientist’, 219, that 
Qohelet ‘sets out deliberately to observe in an empirical way… But…nothing 
observable is in the end valid, as giving the final truth about life, or as providing 
satisfaction, meaning, or profit.’
36  Qohelet’s take on all human property is very like that expressed in a familiar 
advertising slogan: ‘You never really own a Patek Philippe, you merely look after 
it for the next generation’ (Leagas Delaney agency, 1976–present).
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derived from dogmatic statements, which, far from being affirmed 
by his observations, often stand in contradiction to them (cf. 
Gericke, ‘Concept of Deity’, 3). Indeed, since the whole problem 
of perception is rooted, for him, in an understanding that the world 
we can see does not adequately represent the world as it really is, 
perception is problematized by his belief in a different, unobserv-
able reality.37 In Qohelet’s ‘real’ world, God differentiates and 
judges humans, or treats them according to their fear of him, and 
he arranges human lives according to his own preferences, but little 
or none of this is visible to humans (cf. Piotti, ‘Percezione II’). In 
the ‘real’ world, likewise, there is a meaning and a reason for events 
that seem random and unpredictable to humans with their restricted 
insight. To his audience, who would surely have shared his belief in 
the validity of these religious beliefs, Qohelet is effectively saying 
that, if the world as we see it seems not to reflect them, it is not 
because they are unreal, but because we cannot properly see the 
world.
This is a dogmatic, theological conservatism, but its implica-
tions are radical in other areas. Most importantly, if such realities 
are invisible to us, or even hidden from us, then this fact inevitably 
casts doubt on claims made about revelation and about the capaci-
ties of human wisdom. Qohelet has nothing to say directly about 
the former, although the context of his comments about dreams 
in 5.2 and 5.6 suggests that they may be a dismissal of individual 
aspirations to gain insight directly from God (see the commentary).38 
37  O’Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah, 144, suggests that Qohelet ‘creates irony 
by juxtaposing his a priori worldview alongside his experiential knowledge 
without offering an explanation’, and later (149) that ‘It is these unexpected turns 
from empirical to rational/traditional judgments which force readers to question 
Qohelet’s epistemological foundations and his relation to his tradition’. That may 
be so for readers whose focus is on Qohelet himself, but where such juxtapositions 
are clearly deliberate, it seems more probable that they are intended to address 
human perceptions in general, rather than Qohelet’s in particular.
38  I doubt that those comments are directed consciously at the claims of 
apocalyptic literature (cf. Rosso Ubigli, ‘Qohelet di fronte’, 227–28; Mazzinghi, 
‘Enochism’, 161–64), not least because I understand them to be set within the 
context of his advice about the temple in particular. More generally, though, if 
Qohelet is making a deliberate reference to Deut 23.22 (  23.21) in 5.3—on 
which, see below—then he does cite the Torah, and although 4.17 seems to cast 
doubt on the need for anyone but fools to sacrifice, it is doubtful that we can read 
that as an outright rejection of legal prescriptions. Equally, the limits placed on 
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He has a great deal to say about wisdom, however, much of which 
denies its ability to rise above the mundane, and qualifies its useful-
ness even there. Qohelet’s understanding is also radical, of course, 
in other respects: a dogmatic belief in divine determinism has conse-
quences for the reality of human choice, and, as ch. 3 shows, for the 
whole concept of any action being inherently good or bad (an idea 
that will be picked up in ch. 9). On the other hand, his ideas about 
pleasure arise, by elimination, from the beliefs that drive Qohelet to 
exclude any other form of compensation. Again, though, such ideas 
are drawn out as the logical consequence of Qohelet’s beliefs, not 
as the result of observation—which could not itself reveal them. 
We might, therefore, properly add to a description of Qohelet as 
dogmatist the qualification that he implicitly reasons on the basis 
of his dogmas—but it would be misleading to think of him as an 
empiricist.
Having said that his audience would most likely have shared 
some of Qohelet’s beliefs, finally, it is important to stress that 
they might have had somewhat greater difficulty accepting either 
some of his extrapolations from those beliefs, or some of his other 
dogmatic ideas. Qohelet’s restrictive definition of profit, most 
notably, is crucial in the account of his own development, but it is 
difficult to believe that many would have shared such a definition, 
or would have reacted as Qohelet does when he turns to inspect 
his achievements in 2.11. This is something that we shall consider 
shortly, when we look at the characterization of Qohelet, but more 
immediately it should alert us to an element of artificiality in the 
account of his thinking. It is interesting to examine the episte-
mological assumptions of the monologue, in a way that the book 
human knowledge by Qohelet do not exclude the possibility of accepting prophecy 
or the Torah as sources of revelation, and it seems likely that Qohelet’s ideas 
about judgment and divine control, as well as his more general reference to, e.g., 
righteousness, are implicitly rooted in a piety that would necessarily draw on some 
sort of revelation. While he shows no specific interest in the topic, therefore (as 
Schultz, ‘Was Qohelet’, 212, points out), we should probably not take his silence 
to suggest that the worldview attributed to Qohelet would have been understood 
by his audience to exclude altogether the possibility of divine communication 
with humans. On the other hand, Qohelet clearly does not presume the sort of 
links between Torah and wisdom that we find in Prov 1–9 and Ben Sira, or the 
corresponding portrayals of law as a source of insight into the will of God more 
generally.
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itself does not, but there are peculiarities and idiosyncracies here 
that would surely have struck the original audience—perhaps more 
forcefully than they strike modern readers, who are accustomed to 
find the unfamiliar in an ancient text—and we should be wary of 
assuming that Qohelet is always adopting, or even attempting to 
model common beliefs and approaches in this area.
4. The Epilogue and the Portrayal of Qohelet
Qohelet presents himself to us in the monologue as a man who 
has devoted much of his life to answering certain questions, but 
who has found no adequate answers. He tells us of his own resent-
ments, and sometimes of his incapacities, as well as of his many 
observations, and there is an invitation throughout for us to engage 
with him as a fellow human. His monologue ends, moreover, with 
dramatic, jarring images of death, culminating in a bleak restate-
ment of the claim with which he began. It is more than a little 
disconcerting, therefore, when the last few verses of the book take 
pains to inform us that Qohelet was actually a writer and crafter of 
words, that all books like this are intended to be painful—so it’s 
probably not a good idea to read any more—and that we should 
just fear God and do what he says. The problem is not simply that 
these statements seem out of step with all that has been said so 
far, but that they positively dismantle it: every effort that has been 
made to engage our sympathies, to provoke our laughter, anger or 
sadness, is revealed as deliberate manipulation by a clever writer, 
working in a tradition that specializes in such manipulation. With a 
metatheatrical flourish, this whole book, so concerned with illusion 
and misplaced belief, is shown to have been a sort of illusion itself, 
and, by implication, our suspension of disbelief as we listened 
to Qohelet merely another symptom of a broader problem: the 
imagery used is of sheep-herding, and it is we, the audience, who 
have been the sheep.39
39  So, a little differently, Koosed, (Per)mutations, 110: ‘Qoh 12:11–12 does 
not fit comfortably with the book as a whole. In fact, it seems to undermine the 
very activity of study and book writing without which this book would never 
have come into existence.’ She goes on to point out (111) that ‘a book that begins 
with the emptiness of life…could not believe its own self to be full of weighty 
meaning’.
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Going beyond this, whoever is speaking to us at the end of 
the book not only reminds us that it was all just a story, but then 
warns us against any other such painful books, and finally sends 
us away with some more conventional advice to be pious. For 
the only time in Ecclesiastes, moreover, we are addressed as ‘my 
child’ in 12.12, which seems to establish the speaker’s tone here 
as that of a concerned parent, and we hardly need the other literary 
resonances of that expression, so popular in Proverbs, to discern a 
critical comment on advice literature more generally: ‘The words 
of wise men are like goads, and like embedded spikes… There is 
much working on books without end, and much study is a wearying 
of the flesh’ (12.11–12). For all that the admonition here might seem 
to say ‘this is the only advice you should ever read’—which would 
be respectful, if a little odd—there is also an implication that we 
might have done better not even to have read this one, and that the 
subsequent advice to ‘Fear God and keep his commandments’ is all 
we really need. Despite some praise for Qohelet’s talents as a writer 
and a teller of truth, therefore, the epilogue—‘the first commentary 
on the book’, as Dell describes it (‘Ecclesiastes as Wisdom’, 309)—
is hardly a ringing endorsement of his monologue, and seems more 
concerned that we should not worry about it too much.40
It is hard to believe that this is just clumsiness—the result, perhaps, 
of some later writer who wished to praise Qohelet inadvertently 
undercutting what had been said: there is no obvious place in such 
an attempt for 12.11–12 (which is why, perhaps, scholars who take 
such an approach to the problem usually end up finding multiple 
later editors—Koenen, ‘Zu den Epilogen’, is a notable exception). 
While it is commonly suggested, moreover, that the last two verses, 
12.13–14, were added to make the book more palatable to orthodox 
readers (whatever that might have meant at the time), it is likewise 
difficult to imagine who might have felt this way about the book but 
nevertheless wanted to commend it—or who might have thought, 
for that matter, that two such conventional verses would actually 
make up for the more than two hundred verses that had gone before. 
It is altogether simpler to suppose that the author of the monologue 
has merely adopted another voice here, to say something about that 
40  Scholars have paid curiously little attention to the tensions between the 
monologue and the epilogue, but see the thoughtful remarks in Laurent, ‘Le 
Livre’, 8–14.
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monologue, even if it seems to follow that, in some sense, he must 
wish to distance the book as a whole from the words of its key 
protagonist (see my ‘Fear God’).
In his new persona as epilogist, the author now takes the stage that 
Qohelet has vacated, and turns his views back on him.41 Qohelet was 
indeed wise, while his teaching and his carefully crafted words have 
persisted beyond him and continue to convey a knowledge of the 
truth—but that is something about which we should be concerned. 
Such truth is painful, and to hear the words of Qohelet or of other 
wise men is potentially to experience all the downsides of wisdom 
that Qohelet has been so concerned to emphasize. The epilogue 
draws out, then, the irony that is inherent in a book of ‘wisdom’ 
that regards wisdom without enthusiasm, and disengages us from the 
rhetoric that might sweep us up into sharing Qohelet’s bleak outlook. 
Insofar as we can judge the tone of such things, I think that it does so 
rather playfully: the imagery of spikes and goads is a bit too vivid, 
perhaps, and the dismissal of endless books a bit too world-weary 
for us to take the statements as entirely earnest. Besides, if the author 
was really so concerned about the effects, he could simply not have 
written the book in the first place (and if these are not words from 
the author, we could say much the same of any later editor who 
wrote them, presumably under no compulsion to transmit the book). 
If this strange epilogue is indeed a little tongue-in-cheek, however, 
it makes some important points, both about the character of what 
has preceded, and about the ways in which we should react to it. If 
the author does distance himself from Qohelet at this crucial point, 
furthermore, then it raises legitimate questions about how we are 
supposed to view that character elsewhere in the book.
Those questions are difficult to answer in full. In matters like the 
idiosyncracy of Qohelet’s language (which we shall look at later), 
his curious name, and his apparent fondness for commercial termi-
nology like ‘profit’ and ‘loss’ (cf. 1.15),42 we can see that there was 
41  Willmes, Menschliches Schicksal, 240, speaks aptly of the epilogue 
presenting ‘eine ironische Parabase’: in early Greek comedy, the parabasis is a sort 
of intermission, during which, with the actors absent, the chorus sets aside its role 
within the play to step forward and address the audience directly on some topic, 
often to do with the play or the playwright.
42  See Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 34–36, and the works cited there 
in n. 50.
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probably scope for the author to have shaped perceptions of his 
character by the audience. We ourselves lack sufficient knowledge 
of the context to be sure just how they would have reacted—
although it is probably possible to say that there is little in any of 
these to suggest that he was being portrayed as either the regal or 
the scholarly figure that many commentators have wanted to find 
(or, for that matter, as the dandy that Morse memorably constructs 
in his two-part ‘Introduction’). What does come across more clearly 
is Qohelet’s extraordinary materialism. The monologue begins with 
the question that will dominate his concerns—‘What profit is there 
for a human in any of his business, at which he works beneath 
the sun?’—and if we construe that merely as a question about the 
meaning or purpose of human life, then it seems unexceptionable. 
As Qohelet goes on, however, it becomes clear that he really does 
mean, very literally, a ‘profit’: he wants to know what a human can 
achieve so that in death they have more than they had at birth, and 
accordingly have something concrete to show for all the hard work 
of living.
That is something, perhaps, about which fewer people would be 
concerned, and even if the original audience might have shared his 
disbelief in any meaningful afterlife, it seems difficult to accept that 
they would, as readily as Qohelet, have rejected the significance 
of any mark that they might leave on posterity. Not many other 
people, I suspect, would ever likewise have rejected all they had 
made for themselves simply because they would no longer be the 
owner when they died (2.18–19), and although many have doubtless 
sympathized with the calls to enjoyment of life for which Qohelet is 
famous, such enjoyment remains second-best for Qohelet himself: 
it is what we all have to settle for, not what he really wants. Qohelet 
understands the world in a way that makes the profit he desires 
inherently unobtainable, and it is doubtful that his audience would 
fully have shared either his understanding of the world or his desire 
for such a particular sort of profit.
If we think also of his initial inability to see the purpose of 
pleasure (2.2) or recall, say, his deadpan delivery of the sayings 
in 7.1–6, which commend melancholy and the rebukes of the wise 
above the celebration and laughter of the foolish, then we might 
also suspect that Qohelet is being portrayed as somewhat less than 
fun-loving, for all his calls to enjoy life. Although there is doubtless 
some movement in his ideas about such matters, as I have noted 
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above, the only point at which he actually depicts himself as finding 
pleasure is in 2.10, where he declares that he enjoyed the creation 
and running of his business, while 2.1 probably depicts pleasure 
as something that he could only experience by force-feeding it to 
himself. We could easily go into some other curious aspects of the 
monologue, and most especially 4.9–12, where Qohelet commends 
company with no apparent concept of companionship,43 but it 
should be clear already that Qohelet does not naturally place value 
in things which represent neither a material gain nor a definable 
benefit—even pleasure only has meaning to him when he becomes 
able to accept it as such.
The fact that this strange and disconsolate figure calls on us 
to find pleasure in what we do has provoked a certain amount of 
debate about whether his message is ultimately optimistic or pessi-
mistic. Of course, if we are supposed to share Qohelet’s values, then 
we are presumably supposed also to share his sense that the joy to 
be found in work is a poor substitute for the profit that he actually 
seeks, even if he is keen to promote it as better than nothing. If 
it is reasonable to suggest as I have, though, that his views about 
profit were unlikely to have been commonplace, then it is doubtful 
that we are supposed to share his disappointment in finding no such 
profit. Qohelet has lost a shilling and found sixpence, but what he 
commends is likely to be seen as a pure gain by anyone else. To 
that extent, at least, the book perhaps invites us to see Qohelet as 
Whybray does in ‘Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy’, even though this far 
from joyous preacher clearly does not view his own words in that 
way. If it is also reasonable to suggest from the perspective of any 
normal audience, ancient or modern, that Qohelet in 7.1–6 uncon-
sciously promotes the fools, with their joy, singing and laughter, 
over the wise with their morbidity, vexation, melancholy and 
rebukes, then there is at least one other issue over which the author 
probably intends his readers to part company with Qohelet (at least 
43  Lavoie, ‘Analyse de Qohélet 4,9–12’, 208, observes how those verses 
outline the benfits of company ‘de manière froide et sans émotions’, ‘coldly and 
emotionlessly’. Fontaine, never keen to find the best in Qohelet, says in ‘Ecclesi-
astes’, 154, that he ‘views companionship solely from the perspective of what it 
can do for the ego in control’, but even the more sympathetic Jasper, ‘Note for our 
Time’, 266, remarks that ‘the motive of self-interest is not absent even here. It is 
still more a matter of what is advantageous than of what is right.’
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initially), and there may be other, less obvious ones. It seems less 
likely that the author wishes us to embrace Qohelet’s most idiosyn-
cratic positions than that they are intended to engage our interest 
without compelling our agreement.
Taken with what is said in the epilogue about the words of the 
wise, it is tempting to see a satirical edge to all this, and Qohelet has 
indeed been viewed as a parody of some archetypal wise man (see 
especially Shields, ‘Ecclesiastes and the End of Wisdom’, and The 
End of Wisdom, which correspondingly adopt an understanding of 
the epilogue that makes it central to the purposes of the book).44 The 
principal difficulty with that reading in particular is that we have no 
evidence for such an archetype ever having existed: even without 
getting into vexed questions about whether ‘wise men’ ever consti-
tuted an identifiable class, none of the many things said about them 
elsewhere suggests that Qohelet might be an exaggerated embodi-
ment of some ideal. At least for the first few chapters, furthermore, 
he does not use the sort of admonitory or aphoristic styles associ-
ated with ‘the wise’ elsewhere, so if there is any sort of satire on 
ideas, it is not obviously matched by any consistent literary parody. 
If Qohelet’s concerns point to him being any sort of ‘type’, it is 
more probably a businessman than a sage: it is in that sphere that we 
might expect such an assessment of life in terms of profit and loss, 
and I have some suspicion that the audience was intended to see 
him in such terms—but in chs. 5 and 6 he is fiercely critical himself 
of attitudes shaped by wealth. More generally, though, it is far from 
clear that we are supposed to find Qohelet actually unsympathetic 
as a person: even when we may not be expected to share his outlook 
or opinions, he has not obviously been set up for us to ridicule or 
reject. The condescension of the epilogue, on the other hand, and its 
implicit insults to our intelligence, make it hard to believe that we 
44  Longman, 38, suggests not dissimilarly that the epilogue reveals Qohelet’s 
monologue to have been a teaching device, used by the speaker ‘in order to instruct 
his son (12:12) concerning the dangers of speculative, doubting wisdom in Israel’. 
Bolin, Ecclesiastes, 69, sees this as ‘overtly theological’ and ‘one-sided’, allowing 
Longman to identify the supposedly more orthodox epilogist as ‘the inspired 
biblical author’—although Longman himself goes no further than to suggest that 
this is how the book came to be included in the canon. At the very least, this sort 
of reading does play into the conventional dichotomy in interpretations of the book 
between poorly defined ‘orthodox’ and ‘subversive’ views, of which Bolin (64–67) 
is more generally—and rightly—critical.
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are supposed to accept it uncritically as a revelation of Qohelet’s 
inadequacies—even before we try to explain its complimentary 
evaluations of Qohelet himself.
Having said that the style of the book does not suggest a direct 
parody of existing advice literature, though, I should add that 
Qohelet probably does engage with such literature all the same. 
The key passage is the difficult 7.23–29, which we have touched 
on already, and in which Krüger is right, I think, to see Qohelet 
as talking about a personification of wisdom as a woman. More 
broadly, this description of ‘woman Wisdom’ probably forms part 
of an account in which Qohelet, having struggled to be wise, sets 
out unsuccessfully to find her. Such personifications of wisdom 
probably originated in the complex imagery of Proverbs 1–9, 
although they are found in Ben Sira and other subsequent literature 
(see my Instruction and Imagery, 158–169), so when Qohelet sets 
out to find a literal woman, and fails to do so despite encountering 
numerous people, he engages an established imagery on its own 
terms, probably in order to contradict the assertion of Proverbs 1–9 
that wisdom is easily accessible—in that work, she stands in the 
street, not ‘far, and deep, deep down’ (7.23). This corresponds to his 
own more cautious attitudes toward wisdom, which we have looked 
at already, but it also contributes toward the picture of Qohelet that 
the author paints for us. As in the earlier memoir of ch. 2, Qohelet 
acts here, and does not just talk, but even more than in that previous 
account, he behaves with a sort of literal-minded naivety, treating a 
familiar image as though it were a reality, and conducting a pains-
taking enquiry for a woman who does not exist.
Of course, there is a literary conceit involved, but that naivety 
only adds to a sense that Qohelet behaves sometimes almost as an 
idiot savant, and that what distinguishes him from other people is 
not merely intelligence, but a resistance to compromise and illusion 
that comes close to being an incapacity. He is by no means immune 
to emotion, but when Qohelet looks at a world which appears not to 
affirm his beliefs, he does not follow others in altering those beliefs, 
or flinch from accepting truths that are painful to him. The author 
has created him not as an ‘everyman’, but as somebody whose 
unusual perspective sets him apart from most other humans in a 
way that those other humans might find disconcerting, and forces 
him to acknowledge truths that bring him no benefit or happiness. 
He has prepared a speech for woman Wisdom, but he engages 
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explicitly with other people nowhere else: the only conversations 
that he reports are with or in his own heart (e.g. 1.16–17; 2.1, 15; 
3.17–18; 7.25), and this imagery of the self as companion is again 
distinctive enough to suggest that the author uses it deliberately, to 
portray Qohelet as unusually self-contained—if not actually lonely.45
We are probably supposed to imagine that it is his wisdom, 
mentioned so early in his account as exceeding that of others, which 
has shaped Qohelet and his perceptions. This adds piquancy to his 
sense, in ch. 7, that he is no longer wise or capable of wisdom, 
and explains his subsequent treatment of wisdom—if 7.26 is indeed 
talking about personified wisdom, furthermore, then Qohelet views 
himself as having been caught previously in a trap (a part of which 
is constituted by wisdom’s own ‘heart’). The caution expressed 
in the epilogue corresponds to this portrayal: wisdom is a source 
of pain, not happiness, and Qohelet’s whole unhappy discourse 
exemplifies that fact. Qohelet has been too wise (2.15), and himself 
commends others not to make the same mistake (7.16), so that in 
this respect the monologue and epilogue are actually in accord.46 
Qohelet, furthermore, does not benefit personally from revealing 
the true state of the world, and since the principal belief that he 
derives from his experience is that humans should accept and enjoy 
what they have, it is doubtful that he understands this truth itself 
to be of benefit to his audience. Although it first ensures that we 
45  Fontaine, ‘Ecclesiastes’, 154, reads this rather differently: ‘Significantly, the 
author never speaks of entering a meaningful relationship and so lives in a world 
where he is the only true subject. Nature, women, and other social inferiors remain 
objects for his use, so naturally he suffers the boredom of the elite who exist 
in a world populated only by themselves.’ With respect to the ‘heart’, Koosed, 
(Per)mutations, 46–47, draws attention to the fact that, despite 42 uses in the 
book, ‘heart’ has received much less attention than other supposed key terms, 
and goes on to suggest (51) that ‘There is a split at the root of Qohelet’s identity 
between his I and his heart’. She does not follow this up systematically, but 
the usage is certainly distinctive, and represents, I think, a significant aspect of 
Qohelet’s po rtrayal, which enables him to act and speak cooperatively, as it were, 
while remaining isolated. In more than half the uses that Koosed lists, though, the 
heart is not Qohelet’s own, and in, e.g., 11.9–10, the same virtual dichotomy is 
attributed by Qohelet to others. This is an aspect not just of Qohelet, therefore, but 
of the anthropology attributed to him.
46  Perry, Book of Ecclesiastes, 6, suggests that Qohelet offers ‘his own 
curriculum vitae as an example not to follow’, and whether or not that is entirely 
true of Qohelet himself, I think it is probably true of the book as a whole.
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are disengaged from Qohelet’s rhetoric, and itself emphasizes piety 
over pleasure, the epilogue not only picks up much of Qohelet’s 
vocabulary (as we shall see when we turn to it in the commentary), 
but also offers strong continuity, therefore, both with the portrayal 
of Qohelet in the monologue and with an important aspect of his 
message. Qohelet cultivated wisdom to the point that he was forced 
to an unhappy realization of the limits set on life: we should not do 
the same.
5. Unity and Coherence
From all that has been said so far, it will be clear that I consider 
Ecclesiastes to be essentially the work of a single writer, not only 
when it comes to the relationship between the superscription, 
monologue and epilogue, but also with respect to the monologue 
itself. To be sure, Qohelet’s words do not always flow smoothly, 
as a single, coherent discussion, but they are framed as a broadly 
sequential series of experiences, and of reflections arising from 
those experiences, which, at least until the end of ch. 8, are 
commonly conscripted to illustrate the specific points about vapour 
and profit which transcend his individual observations. It is also 
true, as we shall see later, that Qohelet probably draws sometimes 
on existing materials, and it is very likely, furthermore, that the 
text has become damaged at points in the course of transmission—
there are even a few places in which it would not be unreasonable 
to suppose that it has been subject to more deliberate alteration. I 
see no strong grounds, however, on which to suppose either that 
the ‘monologue’ was in fact written in the first place to embody a 
variety of voices or opinions, or that such variety has been intro-
duced by any extensive reworking of the monologue after it had 
first been composed. In this respect, my approach corresponds to 
that of many other recent commentators, but the book has often 
been read very differently in the past, and some of those older 
approaches continue to exercise an influence.
Here it is necessary to distinguish between several different sorts 
of claim. Perhaps the most basic and important is an idea found 
even amongst very early readers of the book, that Qohelet actively 
contradicts himself at various points and in respect of various 
issues (I have explored this at more length in ‘Inner-Textuality’). 
This has often been used to justify other assumptions, and at one 
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level it is probably true: there are significant tensions between some 
of Qohelet’s ideas—most notably his determinism and his insist-
ence on divine judgment—which might be considered theological 
contradictions (although they are rarely described as such on the 
many occasions when they appear in other writings). The more 
direct contradictions that are usually singled out, however, can 
generally be explained either in terms of Qohelet’s changing ideas, 
or as a consequence of failures to recognize the way in which 
Qohelet often qualifies his statements and ideas. An example of the 
first is provided easily enough by his attitude to pleasure, which is 
dismissed as useless in 2.2, even though Qohelet will later commend 
it at many different points as the only real benefit available to 
humans, and explicitly praise it in 8.15. It is doubtful, in fact, that 
he regards it as any more ‘useful’, in his terms, even in those later 
passages, but the important point, anyway, is that Qohelet’s experi-
ences after 2.2 force him to a re-evaluation of his initial opinions. 
Qohelet’s struggles to be wise at the end of ch. 7 present a similar 
contrast with his claims to have been exceptionally wise in 1.16, 
and are surely to be explained in much the same way—but are no 
less problematic, of course, for scholars who read the monologue 
more as a static statement of opinions, than as an account of experi-
ence and development. In his recent commentary, Segal presents 
(110–11) a relatively long list of ‘contradictions’ that he thinks can 
be explained in these terms.
Other apparent contradictions seem specifically formulated to 
make a point. In 2.13–15, for instance, wisdom has an ‘advantage’, 
but Qohelet sees no genuine benefit: all wisdom does is show us 
an uncomfortable truth, without enabling us to change the future. 
In 8.10–14, rather differently, Qohelet protests the reality of divine 
judgment, in the face of common human experience and of apparent 
exceptions, explicitly to make the point that what we see is illusory. 
If we fail to take the point in either case, then of course there is an 
inconsistency—but we will not read such passages better by taking 
everything that Qohelet says as a statement of dogma, subject to 
no qualification. He is not saying ‘wisdom is advantageous’ or 
that ‘God rewards and punishes’ then immediately contradicting 
himself, but setting those statements beside observations in order 
to say something about either the statement or the observation. To 
the extent that he presents a superficial contradiction that invites 
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resolution, we might well say that contradictions are a significant 
component of Qohelet’s discourse—but such cases do not imply 
incoherence.
Many interpreters, however, have seen contradictions in the book 
as symptomatic of a broader issue, and understood there to be several 
different viewpoints on display in the monologue, even where these 
do not actively contradict each other. Broadly speaking, the various 
expressions of this understanding involve any of three assump-
tions: (1) the book actually contained from the outset a dialogue, 
or an interplay between several different characters; (2) the book 
includes quotations of other viewpoints, to which Qohelet reacts; 
or (3) the book began with the expression of a single viewpoint, but 
has been supplemented with material that expresses other views.47 
Such assumptions allow a passage like 8.10–14 simply to be broken 
into different parts, so that, say, the more conventional sentiments 
of 8.12b–13 can be understood either to provoke a contrary reaction 
in 8.14, or to have been added as a way of softening the claim in 
that verse.
In the text as we have it, at least, there is no punctuation or any 
other way to differentiate the supposedly different views without 
reference solely to their content, and some early attempts to restore 
the book, based on more ‘objective’ assumptions that it was origi-
nally written in metrical verse, resulted in such savage, procrustean 
amputations that they have long been discredited.48 Despite the 
linguistic peculiarities that we shall explore later, furthermore, no 
part of the book has self-evidently been composed in a different 
style or dialect of Hebrew which might enable us to distinguish it. 
Without such external criteria available, therefore, all three of these 
approaches present the same methodological difficulty: commenta-
tors who wish to separate the various viewpoints that they find are 
obliged first to define them, and then to apply their pre-determined 
47  I do not include here the various attempts (e.g. Galling; Fischer, Skepsis) to 
see the book as an anthology from the outset, because those attempts are generally 
driven by formal or form-critical considerations, rather than by a concern to 
explain different opinions. Indeed, they usually attribute most of the material to 
a single author.
48  See especially Zapletal, Das Buch Kohelet; Haupt. Loretz, ‘Poetry and 
Prose’, has more recently taken an opposite approach, seeking to identify additions 
to the book in verse.
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templates to the text—which is is no more scientific a procedure 
than Michaelangelo removing the stone that was not David. Even 
if one of the many attempts to isolate separate voices did actually 
stumble upon original distinctions, we should have no way to know 
it or to prove it, and if the book really is composite, then we have 
no agreed basis for distinguishing separate voices or recovering an 
original version.
Martin Rose, unusual amongst recent scholars in his determi-
nation to find redactional layers throughout the book, apparently 
sees the current tendency to treat it as a unified work in terms of 
a passing modern fad, tied up with ‘final-form’ readings of texts 
(see his Rien de nouveau, 21–28), and, to be sure, the development 
of biblical criticism over the last few centuries has owed much to 
the recognition that some texts certainly are composite. It should 
not be our default position, however, that any text must either have 
been created from the wholesale redaction of sources, or have itself 
been subjected to extensive later editing, especially if the content 
as it stands can be explained without resort to such complications. 
In the particular case of Ecclesiastes, the approach that we take 
must be determined, to a great extent, by the limits of our tolerance 
for its formal and ideological inconsistencies. It is also important, 
however, to balance those considerations against the undoubted 
complexity of solutions which attempt to segregate the material.49 
Rose’s own work, for example, involves an assumption that the 
original text was very brief and preserved only in scattered parts of 
chs. 1–3, 8, and 12, sometimes only as short phrases within verses: 
49  Redactional theories about Ecclesiastes generally envisage something much 
less simple than the sort of variation between different versions of Mesopotamian 
‘vanity’ texts (see below) to which Samet draws attention in her ‘Religious 
Redaction’. To be fair, she presents these only as potential analogies to the more 
straightforward addition of an epilogue to the book (although she includes no 
examples of an epilogue, as such), and they undoubtedly demonstrate ways in 
which ancient texts could undergo change and development, albeit in a very 
different context and over a very long period. Even in such cases, however, 
where we know that there has been change, it is difficult to associate such change 
specifically with attempts to qualify or alter the message: from many variants, 
Samet selects only a few instances where that may have been the case, and even 
those involve unprovable assumptions about the coherence and compatibility of 
particular themes.
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this text has then been revised and supplemented, with the revised 
version itself then subsequently revised and supplemented again by 
a third hand. Brandscheidt (Weltbegeisterung) similarly identifies 
a composition that has twice been revised by others, and subjected 
to some additional supplementation—although she does not other-
wise duplicate Rose’s results—and Kustár (‘Neue Sichten’) finds an 
original work that has undergone no fewer than four stages of redac-
tion. Köhlmoos’ identification of additions, principally in the first 
and last chapters, by a writer ‘Z’ (for ‘Zweite Generation’, ‘second-
generation’), who is variously described as an author or editor, is 
simpler—although she too claims that there are further additions to 
be found.50 In no such studies, however, are the processes that are 
assumed to have given rise to the finished text depicted as entirely 
straightforward, and we may reasonably ask whether they provide 
an economic explanation for that text.51 As Jarick, ‘Festival Scrolls’, 
177–79, points out, furthermore, those processes would have to 
have been accomplished swiftly, given the relatively short space of 
time between the likely date of composition and the earliest attes-
tations of the text (on both of which, see below). If they remove 
inconsistencies within Qohelet’s speech, finally, they do so only by 
50  Köhlmoos’ presentation is unusual inasmuch as her ‘Z’ is not used primarily 
to resolve tensions or contradictions, but is depicted as sharpening the pessimism 
of the book, aligning it with outside traditions, and setting it more firmly against 
other incipient movements within Judaism. Although she claims, without specifics, 
that the ‘Z’ material exhibits stylistic differences, no very clear reason is offered 
for distinguishing this material.
51  Or a necessary one. Of Siegfried’s earlier but not dissimilar idea, that the 
original book was extensively supplemented by four further writers or glossators, 
with two epilogists and two editors subsequently inserting additional material, 
Barton (28) comments, ‘It is built upon the supposition that absolutely but one 
type of thought can be harbored by a human mind while it is composing a book’ 
(although he himself then goes on to identify additions by an editor and a Pharisaic 
glossator, 44–46). Condamin observes no less bluntly in ‘Études’, 8:503, that 
‘cependant cette méthode d’exégèse, en ce qui concerne l’Ecclésiaste, est entachée 
d’un vice radical: l’arbitraire’, ‘so far as Ecclesiastes is concerned, this method 
of exegesis is besmirched by a radical vice: arbitrariness’, and goes on to note, 
in the course of a very thorough discussion, that Wildeboer’s commentary, also 
then recently published, had found no need to divide Ecclesiastes that way. More 
recent commentators have sometimes gone further than denying a need: Gese, 
‘Komposition’, for instance, argues that sections often characterized as secondary 
are in fact crucial to the structure of the book.
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suggesting that subsequent editors have deliberately created such 
inconsistencies, and raising a whole new set of questions.52
Attempts to isolate different voices within the original compo-
sition, rather than in redactional layers, go back much further: 
Podechard (‘Composition’, 161–62) notes uses of this explanation 
even in patristic exegesis, and Bolin (Ecclesiastes, 69–71) discusses 
its role in Gregory of Nyssa’s interpretation. At the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, John Yeard understood the monologue in 
terms of a Solomonic discourse which was interrupted at points by a 
‘Worldling’—so 2.24, for instance, could be understood as a decla-
ration by this sensualist, followed by Solomon’s response, with the 
worldling taking over completely for a while in 8.14–9.18.53 More 
than a century later, and a little differently, Joseph Sutcliffe was to 
declare in the introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes that: 
This book is called in Hebrew קהלת , convocator, or 
one who has collected the systems of moralists… It comprises 
a review of life, in which five speakers at least are introduced: 
the disgusted courtier—the philosopher—the stoick—the epicure—
the preacher. Hence it abounds with variation of opinion, with 
discordant sentiments, and systems at issue with one another. For 
want of distinguishing those speakers, whose notions the preacher 
52  I shall not go into the broader issues here, but the Targum (see below) 
provides an interesting illustration of ways in which the meaning of a canonical 
text could be transformed by retaining but re-contextualizing its words. Hayman, 
‘Qohelet’, 156–59, shows a slightly different way in which another early Jewish 
text counters Ecclesiastes through selective quotation and re-interpretation, and 
goes on to explore the similar treatments in rabbinic literature. If an editor did feel, 
for some unknown reason, a need to retain and transmit the words of a non-canon-
ical work with which they disagreed, it is not clear why they would instead simply 
have included explicit qualifications and contradictions; cf. the forceful polemic 
against this approach in Provan, 32–33, and on Rose’s assumptions in particular, 
see Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 10. In that respect, Coppens, in ‘La 
structure’, makes a more plausible claim when he supposes that the book emerged 
in stages, but that the same author was responsible for every stage—although his 
identification of the different elements is, naturally, highly speculative.
53  Yeard, New Paraphrase. The author’s name has been misprinted ‘Ycard’ on 
the title-page, and is often cited accordingly (the error is even replicated in a later 
re-print of the work); the ‘F.’ has also caused confusion, but probably stands for 
‘Father’. Similar views were expressed in the eighteenth century by, e.g., Moses 
Mendelssohn, Johann Herder and Johann Eichhorn—see Weeks, The Making of 
Many Books, 81–82, 114, 116–17, 119.
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attacks, as in chap. 12, men have wrested the sentiments in this book 
to their own destruction. They are ignorant that the preacher, towards 
the close especially, speaks like himself, and as a sincere believer in 
Moses and the prophets. “Fear God, and keep his commandments, 
for this is the whole duty of man.”
Heinemann’s commentary of 1831 (p. 3) had a little earlier 
expressed a similar idea, and the looser notion that Qohelet cites 
a variety of opinions goes back among modern scholars at least to 
de Groot’s commentary of 1644. It is not a view restricted to earlier 
such scholars, moreover, and among the important twentieth-century 
commentators, Levy, for instance, takes Qohelet at various points 
to be quoting and responding to the opinions of others (he reads 
7.6b, for example, as the beginning of a response to views quoted 
in 7.1–6a), while Michel’s commentary sees lengthy citations with 
responses as a key component of the monologue.54 Modern writers 
who take this approach have more generally, though, moved away 
from any notion that the book is a formal dialogue or deliberate 
collection of different opinions, toward the rather different idea that 
Qohelet cites and responds, in a more restricted way, to existing 
sayings and aphorisms, which would have been recognized as such 
by the original audience.55 This understanding, most closely associ-
ated with Gordis and Whybray, can offer such recognition as a partial 
explanation, at least, for the otherwise puzzling lack of any formal 
differentiation between the different voices—although Gordis also 
sometimes translates Qohelet’s own words as introductions to the 
54  Helpfully, there is a list in his slightly later study: Michel, Untersuchungen, 
245–46. Michel offers a justification for his approach in ‘Qohelet-Probleme’.
55  Michel aside, Perry, Dialogues, is the principal exception: Perry reads the 
book as a dialogic essay in which we hear two voices, belonging respectively to 
the pessimistic Qohelet (‘K’), and a presenter (‘P’), who responds to him. See 
also Loewenclau, ‘Kohelet und Sokrates’, which compares Qohelet’s discourse 
to a Socratic dialogue, and more recently Greenwood, ‘Debating Wisdom’. The 
approach should be distinguished from that of Zimmerli, who sees the book not 
as a formal dialogue, but as one side of a debate, in which Qohelet engages with 
a more conventional wisdom represented especially in Proverbs: the conven-
tional wise man is a Gesprächspartner, or ‘interlocutor’ in a less formal sense, 
but Qohelet’s own claims are only to be understood in the light of the claims 
he is attacking. See especially his Introduction (pp. 128–30), and ‘Traktat oder 
Sentenzensammlung?’
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thoughts of others—and even some scope for identification of likely 
quotations using form-critical techniques.56
I have distinguished the ‘dialogue’ and ‘quotation’ approaches 
above—although, truth be told, advocates of each sometimes make 
no clear distinction between them—principally because it is much 
easier to defend the possibility of isolated quotations in the text than 
to explain why any formal dialogue or interplay of voices seems 
to have been constructed so chaotically, and without any indica-
tion of the separate speakers. Being more defensible, however, does 
not imply that the approach is any more likely to be correct. To be 
sure, it is highly likely that Qohelet’s words do include existing 
sayings, even if the epilogue at 12.9 probably does not, as often 
claimed, explicitly depict him as a collector of such sayings. As 
Fox has pointed out, though, in his ‘Identification of Quotations’ 
(a thoroughly sensible article on the subject), this does not make 
any significant difference to what we understand Qohelet to be 
saying, just so long as he is citing opinions with which he agrees. 
The difficulties begin if, like Gordis and others, we take any of his 
citations to be expressions of sentiments with which he disagrees. 
The supposition that when Qohelet says X then Y this should 
sometimes be interpreted ‘(people say) X (but I say) Y’, is open 
to the very basic methodological questions that I have touched on 
with respect to all ideas about multiple voices in the monologue. As 
Fox puts it, moreover, ‘Recognition of quotations…may become 
an all-purpose tool for artificial elimination of difficulties’, and we 
cannot just label anything awkward as a quotation while retaining 
any semblance of exegetical integrity.
That is not to say, of course, that there are no expressions in the 
book of viewpoints with which Qohelet disagrees, and I take 1.10 
and 2.26, in different ways, to include just such expressions. In 
those verses, though, the external claims are clearly marked and 
dismissed. Elsewhere, in 11.3–6 for example (and probably in the 
sayings that immediately precede those verses), Qohelet offers and 
then explicitly undermines advice that is deliberately absurd, and in 
56  Apart from their commentaries, see especially Gordis, ‘Quotations in Wisdom 
Literature’, and ‘Quotations as a Literary Usage’; Whybray, ‘Identification and 
Use’. A similar line has been pursued more recently in Spangenberg, ‘Quotations 
in Ecclesiastes’.
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7.1–6, I think, he makes claims designed to alienate the audience, 
which perhaps help drive him to a re-evaluation of his own assump-
tions. It would be wrong, therefore, to insist that every statement in 
the monologue offers an opinion with which Qohelet consistently 
agrees, but I doubt that the presence of such passages can be used 
to justify the identification of multiple, unmarked quotations: where 
they are not clearly marked, indeed, the extraordinary character of 
their content makes it likely that Qohelet is at best satirizing, rather 
than citing, the opinions of others.
More generally, matters are complicated, of course, by the rela-
tionship between Qohelet and the author of the book: it would not 
be difficult to make the case that any apparent tensions or inconsist-
encies in the monologue result from a conscious decision to draw 
these out, and that the writer does not intend us to find Qohelet 
entirely coherent. Such might be described, perhaps, as the pres-
ence in the text not of different voices, but of different intentions. 
I doubt, in fact, that we are supposed to be driven into disagree-
ment specifically with Qohelet’s views on, say, determinism or the 
afterlife, by our reaction to the problems that he uncovers—with 
the exception of wisdom, about which Qohelet is ultimately critical 
himself, no single issue, after all, receives sufficient focus. It seems 
no less unlikely, on the other hand, that Qohelet is simply a mouth-
piece for the author’s own opinions on every matter, and a degree 
of inconsistency could well be an element of his characterization.
If we insist on finding incoherence then that, or some other 
deliberate purpose, provides a simpler explanation either than 
a complicated literary history or the inclusion from the outset of 
unmarked, contrary opinions that do not belong to Qohelet himself. 
In some cases, furthermore, and perhaps especially with regard to 
aspects of Qohelet’s determinism, it may be that we find difficulties 
which would not have been apparent to the author or the original 
audience, and that we are, in effect, holding the book to too high a 
standard. In any case, though, it will be clear already that I consider 
the actual degree of contradiction and incoherence often to have 
been overstated. On those few occasions when we do encounter 
potential instances, the proper approach is to seek an explana-
tion in each case which does not simply remove material from the 
reckoning.
54 ECCLESIASTES
6. Summary: the nature and purpose of the book
Ecclesiastes presents itself as the words of a very clever but rather 
unusual individual, Qohelet, who has devoted his life to the pursuit 
of a particular problem. In a world where humans each make only 
a brief appearance, to live lives and to act out roles assigned to 
them within processes beyond their comprehension, what can they 
actually achieve on their own behalf and for their own benefit? From 
the outset, Qohelet examines alongside this the quality of wisdom 
and the experience of pleasure. Anticipating at first that wisdom 
will supply his answers, he very rapidly becomes disillusioned with 
it, to the point that he eventually finds himself incapable of being 
wise any more. Having initially dismissed pleasure as pointless, 
however, he comes to appreciate that it is, in fact, the only genuine 
compensation that humans will receive from God for their efforts, 
which offer them benefits only if they can find satisfaction in what 
they are doing. The scope of Qohelet’s enquries is very wide, and 
he examines various spheres of human life. Human relationships 
with the world are characterized almost throughout, however, by 
the failure of humans to appreciate the limitations that are placed 
upon them: they try to grasp what cannot be held, and to have some 
impact upon what cannot be influenced.
Despite the serious tone of Qohelet’s remarks the book is also 
an entertainment, however, with its contents carefully crafted, as 
we shall see later, and its themes expressed in a wide variety of 
different ways. Whatever we are supposed to make of Qohelet 
from listening to his words, moreover, an epilogue suggests that we 
should not, perhaps, take them entirely to heart. It would probably 
not be correct, therefore, to see the book specifically as some sort 
of polemic, even if it does offer a significant critique of any human 
pretensions to wisdom and self-determination, and perhaps accord-
ingly of other literature that promoted such ideas. It may have been 
a desire to advertise Ecclesiastes as on a par with such literature 
that motivated the inclusion of hints that Qohelet was Solomon, or 
like Solomon, but even that is not carried through with any great 
conviction. Especially given the mysterious epithet ‘Qohelet’ itself, 
therefore, and the character’s eventual denial of his own wisdom, 
it seems unlikely that his words are really being attributed to 
Solomon, or that Qohelet is being set up as some alternative source 
of authority. We may like to place works within some broader 
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intellectual movement or debate, and, as we shall see later, it is 
possible to align Qohelet’s ideas with those of certain other works. 
The book itself offers little reason, though, to read it specifically as 
an attempt to overturn established ideas or to pick a fight with other 
authors, and its provocations are of a different order: Ecclesiastes 
invites us not to adopt some particular view of the world, but to 
react to the strong, often startling views of its protagonist. Ostriker 
(‘Ecclesiastes’, 8) talks of Qohelet inventing ‘the thrill of disil-
lusion’, and claims ‘a bracing exhilaration rises from his caustic 
treatment of everyone else’s values’—which, I think, is very much 
the sort of response the book is after.
B. The Date and Context of Ecclesiastes
1. Date
For those interested in the history of ideas or in the development of 
early Judaism, the date of Ecclesiastes is potentially important, and 
a clear understanding of the context within which it was composed 
would certainly help us to assess more clearly the potential 
influences upon it from other sources: it is hard for us to talk about 
the book in relation to other texts or ideas without knowing, at 
least in very broad terms, when it was written. It is doubtful, on the 
other hand, that our understanding and interpretation of the book’s 
message depends to any significant degree on its date: this is not 
a work explicitly intended to address a particular contemporary 
or historical situation, and it sets out, indeed, to tackle questions 
that are essentially universal—even if ultimately the constraints 
that Qohelet places upon the world involve presuppositions that 
not everyone would always have shared. If there are any allusions 
to particular people or events—which I am inclined to doubt—it 
is not clear that we would miss much by overlooking them. From 
an exegetical point of view, therefore, we can get along without 
requiring any absolute consensus in this area, so it may be a little 
surprising to find just how much has been written on this question 
in modern scholarship.
Two manuscripts of Ecclesiastes were found among the Dead Sea 
Scrolls, and we shall look at these in more detail below. The earlier 
(4QQoha) has been dated palaeographically to the first half of the 
second century —more precisely to around 175–150 —and 
